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Article
DUE PROCESS ABROAD
Nathan S. Chapman
ABSTRACT—Defining the scope of the Constitution’s application outside
U.S. territory is more important than ever. In February, the Supreme Court
heard oral argument about whether the Constitution applies when a U.S.
officer shoots a Mexican teenager across the border. At the same time,
federal courts across the country scrambled to evaluate the constitutionality
of an Executive Order that, among other things, deprived immigrants of
their right to reenter the United States. Yet the extraterritorial reach of the
Due Process Clause—the broadest constitutional limit on the government’s
authority to deprive persons of “life, liberty, or property”—remains
obscure.
Up to now, scholars have uniformly concluded that the founding
generation did not understand due process to apply abroad, at least not to
aliens. This Article challenges that consensus. Based on the historical
background, constitutional structure, and the early practice of federal law
enforcement on the high seas, this Article argues that the founding
generation understood due process to apply to any exercise of federal law
enforcement, criminal or civil, against any person anywhere in the world.
Outside the context of war, no one believed that a federal officer could
deprive a suspect of life, liberty, or property without due process of law—
even if the capture occurred abroad or the suspect was a noncitizen.
This history supports generally extending due process to federal
criminal and civil law enforcement, regardless of the suspect’s location or
citizenship. This principle has immediate implications for cross-border
shootings, officially sponsored kidnappings and detentions abroad, the
suspension of immigration benefits, and the acquisition of foreign evidence
for criminal defendants.
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most perplexing questions in contemporary constitutional
law is the extent to which the Bill of Rights applies outside the United

378

112:377 (2017)

Due Process Abroad

States.1 The doctrine is quite literally all over the map. Aliens outside the
United States appear to have few constitutional rights,2 except,
“paradoxically,” those held as enemies at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3
Scholars presume that citizens enjoy the same rights abroad that they have
at home,4 but the only Supreme Court decision that is squarely on point
suggests that due process rights for civilian citizens abroad depend on
context.5 The Court rarely decides cases about whether constitutional rights
apply abroad,6 and when it does, its decisions are often highly fractured.7
The resulting doctrine is piecemeal, ad hoc, and unprincipled.
Recent events have highlighted this doctrinal mess. Last term, the
Supreme Court dodged a case that presented the question of whether the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply when a U.S. agent standing on U.S.
soil shoots and kills a Mexican national on the other side of the border.8
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has issued a series of executive orders
prohibiting “foreign nationals” of specific countries from immigrating to
1

See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?, at v (2009)
(“[B]ecause this principle of territoriality is so commonplace, it is rarely examined and surprisingly ill
defended.”).
2
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established that certain
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside
of our geographic borders.”). See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269
(1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search of an alien’s residence abroad);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not apply
to enemy soldiers captured and detained abroad).
3
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008). See generally Mary Van Houten, The PostBoumediene Paradox, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2014) (discussing the “paradox” of extending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to enemy aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba without
extending the protections of the Due Process Clause to nonenemy aliens abroad).
4
See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 25 (“Today it is well accepted that the Bill of Rights protects
U.S. citizens against their government wherever those citizens might be found.”).
5
See Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 1 (1957).
6
Throughout this Article I use the term abroad to mean “outside U.S. territory.” The term is tidier,
though admittedly more ambiguous, than extraterritorially. See P.G. Wodehouse, The Amazing Hat
Mystery, in THE BEST OF WODEHOUSE 393 (2007) (“‘It’s the Spirit of something,’ said Nelson. ‘I don’t
know what, quite, but of something. You see it on all sides. Something very serious has gone wrong
with girls nowadays. There is lawlessness and license abroad.’ ‘And here in England, too.’ ‘Well,
naturally, you silly ass,’ said Nelson, with some asperity. ‘When I said abroad, I didn’t mean abroad, I
meant abroad.’”).
7
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261 (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the Court); id. at 275
(Kennedy, J., joining the Court’s opinion but offering a much more functional rationale); id. at 279
(Stevens, J., concurring in the result but not the rationale); Reid, 351 U.S. at 3 (Black, J., plurality
opinion); id. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result).
8
Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam), vacating and remanding Hernández v.
United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that Mesa was entitled to qualified
immunity on the Fifth Amendment claim and that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
shooting).
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the United States.9 Each of the orders has raised questions about the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to aliens abroad.10 The government, lower
courts, and those affected by the government’s extraterritorial exercise of
power would all benefit from a clearer formula for determining when the
Bill of Rights applies abroad.
With respect to the Due Process Clause especially, the current
doctrinal map is difficult to justify by reference to the constitutional text.
The Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”11 As scholars have noted, the
Clause seems to speak universally, without reference to location or
citizenship.12
Yet scholars seem to uniformly agree that early American history
supports the notion that due process stopped—especially for aliens—at the
nation’s borders.13 Professor Gerald Neuman summarizes the consensus:
“The authors of the Bill of Rights almost certainly viewed everyone’s
constitutional rights as territorially restricted by the national boundaries;
that view is utterly discredited today, and the question whether nonresident
aliens’ rights should continue to be so restricted cannot be answered by
direct recourse to eighteenth-century practice.”14 The consensus is
unsurprising. As Professor Andrew Kent has noted, “Globalists have not

9

The current Order is a Presidential Proclamation dated September 24, 2017. The Proclamation
appears to update and in some respects to supersede Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209
(Mar. 6, 2017), which replaced Executive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
10
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017),
vacating and remanding 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (upholding a nationwide injunction against the
March 6, 2017 Order on the ground that it likely violated the Establishment Clause); Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding a nationwide injunction against the January 27, 2017
Executive Order on the ground that it likely violated the Due Process Clause).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 11, 32 (1985); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1,
8 (2003); Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 875–76 (1989).
13
See GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) (“Strict territoriality
prevailed as dogma for most of American constitutional history.”); RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 38;
Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1904 (2009) (“[T]he law generally
had no coercive force (and thus a court had no jurisdiction or process) outside sovereign territory.”); J.
Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 518–21
(2007) (presenting evidence that due process did not apply to aliens abroad); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 916–27 (1991) (canvassing a variety of views based on background
law of nations principles); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the
Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 234 (2010) (“Prevailing nineteenth-century law
principles established that a nation’s legal jurisdiction to regulate conduct was coterminous with its
territory.”).
14
NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 912.
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presented any Founding era evidence that ‘due process’ was thought to
protect aliens abroad.”15
This Article challenges the scholarly consensus. It argues that the
Constitution’s historical background and text and early American practice
all strongly support the conclusion that the founding generation understood
the Due Process Clause to apply to U.S. law enforcement against anyone,
anywhere. This history challenges the Court’s gerrymandering of due
process on the basis of geography and citizenship.
The evidence falls into three broad categories. First, the British
constitutional norm was that offenses at sea were tried according to due
process. An Act of Henry VIII provided that special courts of Admiralty
Sessions, composed of common law and admiralty judges, would try
crimes committed within the admiralty jurisdiction by the “course of the
common law . . . in like form and condition as if such offences had been
done upon the land.”16 To make it easier to suppress piracy in the colonies,
however, Parliament provided that vice-admiralty courts could try piracy in
the colonies according to the civil law.17 American colonists generally
objected to the trial of crimes by vice-admiralty courts because they
believed Americans were entitled to the customary rights of Englishmen,
especially trial by jury, the sine qua non of traditional due process.18 In
short, British law and American beliefs about that law suggest that
Americans would have found the act of Henry VIII—requiring the trial of
offenses at sea according to the common law—to be constitutionally
required.
Second, the Constitution’s text suggests no territorial or citizenship
limits on due process. As Professor Michael McConnell and I have argued,
through the Antebellum Era, Americans understood due process to
encapsulate a principle going back to Magna Carta that the government
may deprive persons of “life, liberty, or property” only according to law.19
To comply with due process, the federal government could deprive
someone of rights only in compliance with the Constitution, statutes,
treaties, court procedures, and general law, including the common law and
the law of nations. The government had no authority to punish someone for
15

Kent, supra note 13, at 521 (emphasis added).
28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536); see also 27 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1536). See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *71 (noting that pirates were entitled to “the common law of the land”).
17
An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 Will. 3 c. 7 (1698), reprinted in
3 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1600–1730, at 59 (Baer ed.,
2007).
18
See infra Section II.C.
19
See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012).
16
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a crime before a federal jury trial conviction or to enforce a forfeiture of
property without a federal court judgment according to lawful procedures.
Nothing in the constitutional text suggests that due process protected only
citizens or applied only to deprivations of rights within U.S. territory.20
Third, and perhaps most importantly, early practice uniformly
comported with the plain meaning of the constitutional text. All of the
evidence from early practice suggests that Americans believed the Due
Process Clause extended to all law enforcement, even to law enforcement
against aliens abroad. So far, scholars examining the Constitution’s
extraterritoriality have largely ignored U.S. law enforcement on the high
seas, but it occupied more federal resources than any other sort of law
enforcement in the nation’s first generation.21 The federal statutes that
defined piracy, the slave trade, and violations of U.S. neutrality stipulated
that a defendant could be punished—criminally and civilly—only upon
judgment in a federal court.22 Federal officers who captured suspects on the
high seas, in foreign territorial waters, and even on foreign soil transported
them back to the United States, where those suspects received the same due
process protections as any other federal defendant.23 No one ever suggested
that the rules could be different for suspects captured outside the United
States, whether they were citizens or aliens. Criminal and civil law
enforcement on the high seas overlapped in interesting ways, but for both,
the federal government made a final deprivation of rights only after
judgment in a federal court according to procedures stipulated by law—
common law procedures and jury trial in criminal cases and admiralty
procedures in civil condemnation suits.24
Americans never debated whether the Due Process Clause applied
abroad. But the jurists and statesmen—such as Justice Iredell, William
Wirt, Albert Gallatin, and John Quincy Adams—who considered the
question concluded that the Fifth Amendment applied to all U.S. law
enforcement.25 Executive practice was consistent with this. Although U.S.
officers sometimes used force against suspects who resisted arrest, there is
no evidence that U.S. officers believed they could punish suspects captured
on the high seas without ordinary federal court procedures.26 Indeed, federal
20

See infra Part III.
See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829, at 215 (1985) (admiralty and maritime crimes accounted for over
30% of indictments from 1801 to 1829).
22
See infra Part IV.
23
See infra Part IV.
24
See infra Section IV.B.
25
See infra Sections V.A–B.
26
See infra Section V.B.
21
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courts would have held an officer who did so personally liable in a
damages action for marine trespass.27 Americans maintained this absolute,
extraterritorial requirement of due process in spite of the fact that, as
Britain had already discovered, common law protections made it difficult to
suppress piracy (and the slave trade). Enforcing due process was costly,
which suggests that Americans felt themselves obligated to do so.
Why has this evidence eluded legal scholars? The main reason, I
think, is that those considering early extraterritoriality have tended to focus
on the federal government’s exercise of war powers rather than law
enforcement.28 But war was an exceptional legal state. Americans
understood that enemies were different than those suspected of violating
municipal (i.e., domestic) law. While the early understanding of due
process during war has yet to be fully explored, the evidence suggests that
the government understood itself to be able to deprive members of enemy
military forces of “life, liberty, or property” through the exercise of war
powers without the ordinary constraints of due process.29 Studies that have
focused on wartime deprivations have overlooked the evidence provided by
the nation’s early law enforcement activities on the high seas.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the gap in the
historical scholarship. Part II introduces the British and law of nations
background. Part III discusses the implications of the U.S. Constitution’s
structure and text. Parts IV and V present the early U.S. practice of law
enforcement abroad, and Part VI explores implications of this history for
contemporary constitutional doctrine.
I.   A HOLE THE SIZE OF THE SEA
The Due Process Clause appears to be “universalist”30—it provides
without qualification that “[n]o person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”31 Based in part on this text, some

27

See infra Section V.C.
See infra Section I.B.
29
See infra Section V.B.3.
30
See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 916 (describing universalism as an approach to constitutional
interpretation requiring that “constitutional provisions that create rights with no express limitations as to
the persons or places covered should be interpreted as applicable to every person and at every place”).
31
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—
The International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from
Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 868 (2003). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1957)
(Black, J., plurality opinion) (“While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which
are ‘fundamental’ protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking
and choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly fastened on
all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.”).
28
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scholars and judges have argued that due process should presumptively
extend abroad, at least to citizens and aliens who are otherwise subject to
U.S. law.32
Scholars have generally agreed, however, that the early history
contradicts the apparently plain meaning of the Due Process Clause. They
argue that background principles of law and politics, coupled with early
U.S. military action abroad, show that Americans did not believe due
process extended beyond the nation’s borders, at least not for aliens.33
As this Part explains, no one has carefully explored the most salient
historical evidence: early American law enforcement on the high seas,
understood in light of the English historical background.
A.   Background Political and Legal Principles
Some scholars have concluded that early Americans did not
understand constitutional rights to extend beyond the nation’s borders
based on background principles of politics and law. The most fundamental
of these was the social compact: Americans inherited the principle that a
nation gains sovereignty from the consent of the governed.34 This principle
raises a question about who is entitled to the protection of the law. Relying
on the social compact, a handful of Americans argued during the debates
over the Alien Acts of 1798 that only citizens are entitled to due process of
law.35 Very few statesmen, even those who supported the Acts, adopted this
position.36 For most Americans, the social compact principle did not, of its
32

See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 99–102; see also Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 314 (2004) (“[T]he text of the U.S. Constitution constrains neither the political
branches from acting abroad nor the judicial branch from reviewing their actions.”); Bryan William
Horn, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth Amendment Protection Against Coerced SelfIncrimination, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 367, 375 (1992) (arguing that the language of the Fifth
Amendment does not restrict itself to trials involving citizens or define any geographical limits);
Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial Power and the United
States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 147, 197 (1999) (arguing that constitutional rights
extend abroad if the agent of the United States alleged to have violated a right was acting in a sovereign
capacity over the alleged victim).
33
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. I, § 1 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) (“A nation or a state is, as has been said at the beginning of
this work, a body politic, or a society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual
safety and advantage by their combined strength.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *47–48
(suggesting that the community should guard the rights of each individual member in return for the
individual submitting to the laws of the community).
35
NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 930–31. On the Alien and Sedition Acts generally, see JOHN C.
MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM (1951).
36
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801,
at 257 (1996) (noting that this position “seems simply wrong”); see also NEUMAN, supra note 13, at
937–43 (few endorsed it).
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own accord, necessarily imply that the Constitution protected citizens
alone.37
Other scholars, including Philip Hamburger, have argued that the
reciprocal loyalty principle—another longstanding principle in the common
law and the law of nations—would have extended the Constitution’s
protections not only to citizens but also to resident aliens.38 This principle
placed a responsibility on the sovereign to provide the protection of the
laws in exchange for political loyalty. This reciprocal relationship adhered
between the sovereign and all subjects, including citizens and non-enemy
resident aliens.39 This principle excluded nonresident aliens from the
protection of the law including, at least implicitly, the Constitution.
During the Alien Act debate, a number of Americans appear to have
held some version of this view. John Marshall defended the Alien Friends
Act on the ground that it authorized the President to dispense with ordinary
protections of due process only for resident aliens suspected of being
enemies or at least potential enemies.40 Apparently he believed that such
suspicion was sufficient to remove aliens from the protection of some of
the laws (including the basic requirements of due process). James Madison,
who opposed the Alien Friends Act on the ground that it deprived alien
friends of due process of law,41 nevertheless acknowledged that alien
enemies—subjects of a nation with which the United States was in fact at
war—were not entitled to the full protection of U.S. municipal (i.e.,
domestic) law.42 Most importantly for the purpose of this Article, the
proponents of this view were not concerned with the extension of U.S.
law—punitive or protective—outside U.S. borders. Rather, they were
principally concerned with whether enemies, including those found within
the United States, were entitled to constitutional protections. As this Article
argues, the legal category that most determined one’s municipal rights,
including the right to due process, was war—not location or nationality.
During war, location and nationality often did make a difference. Outside

37

See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 937–43.
See generally Hamburger, supra note 13.
39
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *365–75; VATTEL, supra note 34, bk. I, ch. XIV, § 213.
40
See NEUMAN, supra note 13 at 930–31 (discussing the Federalist Address to the Minority in the
Virginia House, authored in part by Marshall and Henry Lee).
41
James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556–57 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“Alien friends, except in
the single case of public ministers, are under the municipal law, and must be tried and punished
according to that law only.”).
42
NEUMAN, supra note 13 at 936–37.
38
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of war, the government was bound by the ordinary requirements of due
process.
A third principle relied upon by those who argue against the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution is the principle of territorial
sovereignty.43 Under the law of nations at the time of the Founding, and
under international law today, a nation’s legislative and judicial jurisdiction
within its own territory is exclusive.44 This means that ordinarily a nation
cannot exercise authority over conduct within another nation’s territory.
There have always been important exceptions: nations may govern the
conduct of their own subjects (and perhaps others) on the high seas45 and
nations may govern the conduct of those within another nation’s sovereign
territory with that sovereign’s consent (usually by treaty).46
The implication of this principle for constitutional extraterritoriality is
straightforward. The Due Process Clause is a law that does not purport to
apply extraterritorially—why should it be understood to do so? Based in
part on this principle, for instance, in 1891 the Supreme Court held that a
U.S. consular tribunal that punished a U.S. seaman for violating Japan’s
law in Japanese waters did not have to comply with the Bill of Rights.47
The Court reasoned that the law of Japan, not the U.S. Constitution,
governs conduct in Japan.48
This conclusion does not follow from the principle of territorial
sovereignty, however. U.S. law clearly did apply in Japan—it was U.S. law
43

See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (“By the [C]onstitution a government is ordained
and established ‘for the United States of America,’ and not for countries outside their limits.”).
44
See VATTEL, supra note 34, Preliminaries, §§ 4, 15; David L. Sloss et al., Conclusion:
Continuity and Change Over Two Centuries, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
589, 599 (Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the
marriage of the Charming Betsy canon to customary international law rules limiting each nation’s
jurisdiction (with a few exceptions) to its own territory.”); Stephane Beaulac, Vattel’s Doctrine on
Territory Transfers in International Law and the Cession of Louisiana to the United States of America,
63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1340 (2003) (Vattel was responsible for the “externalization of sovereignty”); see
also id. bk I, ch. I, § 4, ch. 3, § 37; id. bk. II, ch. IV, § 54.
45
In an early case, a litigant before the Supreme Court “conceded that the legislation of every
country is territorial; that beyond its own territory, it can only affect its own subjects or citizens.” Rose
v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 279 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.). The concession was not material to the case’s
resolution. See id. at 281 (Livingston, J., joined by Cushing, J., & Chase, J., concurring in the
judgment). A majority of the Court was so reluctant to subscribe to such a limitation on a sovereign’s
right to govern conduct of nonsubjects on the high seas that they either expressly declined to take a
position on the issue, see id., or argued for an entirely different framework, see id. at 288 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (“Within their jurisdictional limits the rights of sovereignty are exclusive; upon the ocean
they are concurrent.”). As this Article discusses in Section V.A, by the 1820s, Congress exercised
authority to punish piracy committed by some nonsubjects on the high seas, and the courts acquiesced.
46
See, e.g., infra Part IV.
47
In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464.
48
Id.
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that authorized the consular tribunal to exercise any U.S. authority
whatsoever. The question, then, was whether the Bill of Rights places
limits on that authority, or, alternatively, whether the Bill of Rights stops at
the borders, even when the Constitution’s power-creating provisions go
abroad.49
Early Americans subscribed to each of the foregoing principles—the
social compact, reciprocal loyalty and protection, and exclusive territorial
sovereignty—at some level of abstraction, for some purposes. These
principles therefore formed part of the framework for the American
understanding of constitutional extraterritoriality. But the principles were
not determinative. As scholars of empire have shown, early modern nationstates like the United States struggled to understand the relationship
between these three principles as they asserted various degrees of dominion
and sovereignty over a patchwork of territory around the globe.50 Most
importantly, Americans integrated these principles into their understanding
of their new constitutional system, one with a federal government with
powers that were limited both inherently and by express provisions like the
Due Process Clause.
B.   Distinguishing Law Enforcement from War
Scholars have also explored constitutional extraterritoriality by
looking to the early extraterritorial conduct of the U.S. military. Andrew
Kent, a “pioneer in the field,”51 has made the most thorough historical case
against the extraterritoriality of due process.52 U.S. military operations
abroad, including those with the purpose of enforcing U.S. law, “were
governed by international law, diplomacy, and policy judgments, not the
Constitution.”53 In analyzing the historical evidence and coming to this
conclusion, however, Kent blurred the line between war and law

49

See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 944.
See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 94 (2000) (“[T]he
problem of united imperium and dominium . . . [was] the fundamentally and ultimately combustible
dilemma at the core of the British imperial ideology.”); LAUREN BENTON, SEARCHING FOR
SOVEREIGNTY 4 (2010); CHARLES MAIER, AMONG EMPIRES 101 (2006).
51
Martin Flaherty, The Constitution Follows the Drone, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 35 (2015)
(noting that “serious historical scholarship on Founding views and early practice concerning the
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution to potential noncitizen belligerents has only just gotten
underway”).
52
See Kent, supra note 13, at 528–35.
53
Id. at 536; see also id. at 526 (“[T]here was a strong current of opinion that treaties and the law
of nations provided the legal framework governing the U.S. government’s action abroad, at least in the
absence of contrary congressional regulation.”); id. (“It does not appear that extraterritorial coercive
force by the United States government was thought to implicate constitutional rights of noncitizens.”).
50
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enforcement.54 This is understandable; there is a fair amount of evidence of
early wartime extraterritorial military operations, and given the perennial
importance of the Constitution’s proper application during war, that
evidence has been well researched.55 Furthermore, scholars who have most
recently looked at the historical evidence have done so with an eye for its
implications for the war on terror, a conflict that blurs traditional lines
between war and law enforcement.
Unfortunately, focusing on war muddies the historical analysis. Late
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Americans understood war to be
an exceptional legal state. Under the law of nations, war upended the rights
and duties of belligerent and neutral states and their subjects.56 The
Suspension Clause and the Third Amendment respectively permit the
federal government to exercise extraordinary power to protect Americans
during “[r]ebellion or [i]nvasion”57 or “in time of war”58—power that would
ordinarily violate due process of law.59 To show that waging war abroad
reflects the inapplicability of due process abroad would require first
showing that the exercise of power to wage war (anywhere) was subject to
the ordinary requirements of due process.60 If the question is whether due
process applies abroad, asking whether it applies to the exercise of war
powers abroad puts the cart before the horse. Better to inquire first whether
due process applied to the conduct of U.S. officers abroad when they
enforced U.S. law.
Other scholars have discussed aspects of the U.S. law of piracy and
the slave trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but
none of them have reflected upon the implications of their evidence for the
extraterritoriality of due process.61 This is a significant lacuna in the
54

Id. at 536 (war and law enforcement “do not appear to have been always neatly distinguished”).
The gold standard is ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 689 (2008).
56
See Section V.B.3. See generally The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 667 (1862); Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. 199, 224 (1796) (Chase, J.).
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
58
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
59
See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.).
60
See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress,
113 MICH. L. REV. 1337 (2015).
61
See generally DOUGLAS R. BURGESS, JR., THE PIRATES’ PACT (2009) (exploring the legally
dubious alliances between pirates and colonial American governors); DAVID HEAD, PRIVATEERS OF THE
AMERICAS 7–8 (2015); ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY, at chs. 3–4 (2d ed. 1998); Eugene
Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 79–85, 90–92
(2009); Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the U.S. Constitution, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1069,
1072 (2011).
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historical evidence of early federal constitutionalism. The new government
took its rights and duties under the law of nations quite seriously62 and
devoted significant resources to law enforcement on the high seas.63
Moreover, Americans inhabited a trans-Atlantic maritime culture; they
were intimately acquainted with the law of maritime commerce, prize,
piracy, and the fine distinctions among them.64 Though the topic may seem
antiquated, it was a priority of the early federal government.65 As the next
Parts of this Article argue, the historical evidence strongly suggests that
Americans understood all those suspected of violating U.S. law—
anywhere—to be entitled to due process of law before the government
could deprive them of “life, liberty, or property.”
II.   THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DUE PROCESS ABROAD
Looking at due process through the facet of law enforcement abroad,
rather than war, brings the relevant historical material into focus.
Americans inherited their understanding of how to implement the U.S.’s
rights and duties under the law of nations, including the rights and duties of
law enforcement on the high seas, from British constitutionalism. Despite
its admiralty origins, English courts had long tried piracy cases according
to what Sir William Blackstone called “the common law of the land”—with
a grand jury indictment, a petit jury trial, and the procedural and
evidentiary requirements of the common law.66 Pirates thus received the
same due process as other criminals tried in the common law courts. Britain
departed from this practice in the colonies, however, subjecting pirates to
trial by vice-admiralty commissions that proceeded on ship or land
according to the civil law. As we shall see, the U.S. government rejected
this approach. Under the Constitution and federal statute, every criminal
62

See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,
932 (2010); David L. Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 44 at 7.
63
See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 215 (identifying admiralty and maritime offenses as over
30% of all criminal indictments).
64
See generally 1 THE AMERICAN SHIP-MASTER’S DAILY ASSISTANT; OR, COMPENDIUM OF
MARINE LAW, AND MERCANTILE REGULATIONS AND CUSTOMS (1807) (including chapters on each of
those topics); see also DONALD A. PETRIE, THE PRIZE GAME (1999) (describing the origins of the law
of maritime prize).
65
See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 215; see also 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 407 (1981) (noting that “[t]he early years of the Marshall Court were
dominated by the influx of appeals from prosecutions for illegal trade and by prize cases arising during
the War of 1812 . . . amounting to at least 32 percent of all [Supreme Court] cases” from 1801–1815).
66
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at*67.

389

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

suspect was entitled to a grand jury indictment, a jury trial, and the
procedural protections of the common law, including those accused of
offenses on the high seas.
A.   The Piracy–Prize Dichotomy Under the Law of Nations
Before examining the application of British law on the high seas, it is
important to first understand the “law of nations.” In its simplest
formulation, the law of nations was “the science which teaches the rights
subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to
those rights.”67 Where did those rights and duties come from? By the time
of the War for Independence, English-speaking lawyers generally
understood the law of nations to be “the rules of natural law” applied to the
relationships between sovereign states, along with “mutual compacts,
treaties, leagues and agreements between these several communities.”68 The
law of nations stood in contrast to a state’s “municipal law,” or “a rule of
civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding
what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.”69
Though jurists generally conceived of the law of nations and
municipal law as separate categories of law, they understood them to be
dynamically related. According to Blackstone, the law of nations “is held to
be a part of the law of the land” because it was “adopted in its full extent by
the common law.”70 The “law-merchant” applied in mercantile cases and
the rules of capture applied in prize cases, shipwrecks, and the like.71 There
were also three “principal offences against the law of nations, animadverted
on as such by the municipal law of England”: “1. Violation of safeconducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 3. Piracy.”72
By the late eighteenth century, therefore, it was not unusual for common
law jurists to state that “the law of nations” was not only applied in English
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VATTEL, supra note 34, Preliminaries, § 3.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *43; see also VATTEL, supra note 34, Preliminaries § 6 (“[T]he
law of nations is originally no other than the law of nature applied to nations.”); id. §§ 24–25
(discussing the “law of nations, called conventional, or of treaties” and the “customary law of nations,
or the custom of nations”).
69
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *44.
70
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *67 (“[T]hose acts of parliament which have from time to time
been made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be
considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental
constitutions of the kingdom, without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world.”).
71
Id.
72
Id. at *68.
68
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courts, alongside municipal law, but that it “[was] part of the laws of
England.”73
Importantly, the law of nations emerged from sixteenth-century
conflicts among the western maritime nations over privateering and piracy
on global trade routes.74 The source of these conflicts was often the capture
of a merchant ship laden with cargo bound for Europe from the East or
West Indies.75 Whether another sovereign had sanctioned the capture made
all the difference. If so, it was an act of war. The victim’s sovereign could
respond in kind by issuing a letter of reprisal authorizing a privateer to prey
upon the enemy’s merchant vessels up to the amount of the damages. In
some cases, the first capture could even be considered a declaration of war.
If no sovereign had authorized the capture, however, it was an act of
piracy. The pirate was, at least in theory, an “enemy of all,” liable to be put
to death by anyone who captured him.76
The economics of privateering guaranteed a steady supply of pirates—
it was big business.77 To supplement public warships, a sovereign would
commission private ships to prey on enemy merchants. A commissioned
privateer would capture a ship that appeared to be within the authorization
of the commission (usually an enemy) and place a “prize crew,” including a
prize master, on board the captured ship, and the prize crew would sail the
captured vessel to an admiralty court of the sovereign that had issued the
commission.78 The sovereign would libel (formally prosecute) the ship and
its cargo, and the admiralty court would determine whether it was a good
prize—whether it was within the scope of the privateer’s commission. If so,
the admiralty court would condemn the ship and cargo, order it sold, and
distribute the proceeds according to law. In England, the prize belonged to
the Crown, but the Crown shared it voluntarily with the lords of admiralty
and with the privateer master and crew according to statute or according to
the terms of the commission.79
73

2 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 421 (1792).
See David Armitage, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA xi, xi–xx (David Armitage
ed., Richard Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1609).
75
See id.
76
See generally DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN, THE ENEMY OF ALL: PIRACY AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS 16 (2009) (discussing the Ciceronian origin of the notion that pirates are the “common enemy
of all”); RUBIN, supra note 61, at ch. 2; WOODDESON, supra note 73, at 421–57.
77
See generally JAMES G. LYDON, PIRATES, PRIVATEERS, AND PROFITS (1970) (discussing the
centrality of privateering for the economic development of New York in the eighteenth century).
78
See PETRIE, supra note 64, at 37–38.
79
The richest collection of commissions and opinions in early prize cases is found in volumes 1
and 2 of DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA (R.G. Marsden ed., 1915–16) and
volumes 1 and 2 of SELECT PLEAS OF THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY (R.G. Marsden ed., 1892,
1897).
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During times of peace, privateering commissions were far harder to
come by. Privateering was after all an act of war or reprisal. Some
privateers were not content to return to trade, however. Thus some
percentage of them continued to capture merchant vessels without
sovereign authority—as pirates.80
Because of the politics and economics of captures on the high seas,
nations had reason to enforce piracy laws and to do so with care. Allowing
foreign pirates to prey on merchants was simply bad for business. At the
same time, a nation could hardly tolerate its own subjects attacking foreign
vessels; it invited suspicion (sometimes well-founded) that the sovereign
was encouraging the attacks.81
Prosecuting foreign pirates, however, carried its own risks. Suppose
the defendant had been acting under the orders of another sovereign. Given
the legal and diplomatic implications, this is something the prosecuting
nation would want to know. First, the authorizing sovereign had committed
an act of war. The victim’s sovereign’s rights and duties of war had been
triggered. Second, as a consequence, the defendant was a prisoner of war,
not a criminal, and as such entitled to the protections of the law of war.
Executing the defendant as a pirate could violate the law of war and
complicate diplomatic efforts.82
Such were the dynamics of piracy and prize in the early modern era.
Although all the western maritime powers generally embraced the law of
nations principles that gave rise to these dynamics, as we shall see, each
state implemented its rights and duties according to its own constitution.
B.   Blackstone: Pirates Entitled to the “Law of the Land”
Since the sixteenth century, England had prosecuted pirates according
to the common law. Under Acts of Parliament dating to 1535 and 1536, ad
hoc commissions, not the court of admiralty, tried crimes committed on the
high seas according “to the course of the common law.”83 Sitting as
“Admiralty Sessions,” these commissions ordinarily included common law
80

See HEAD, supra note 61, at 92.
See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE supra note 16, at *68 (“It is therefore incumbent upon the nation
injured, first to demand satisfaction and justice to be done on the offender, by the state to which he
belongs; and, if that be refused or neglected, the sovereign then avows himself an accomplice or abettor
of his subject’s crime, and draws upon his community the calamities of foreign war.”).
82
See, e.g., Palachie’s Case, 81 Eng. Rep. 411 (1615) (K.B.) (Coke, C.J.) (holding that “if the
taking was by an enemy it was not robbery but lawful capture”); see also RUBIN, supra note 61, at 63.
83
27 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1535); 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536); see M.J. Prichard & D.E.C. Yale, Introduction to
HALE AND FLEETWOOD ON ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION, at cxxxvii (M.J. Prichard & D.E.C. Yale eds.,
1993). The statutes both provide that a number of crimes would be punishable “in like form and
condition as if such offences had been done upon the land.” 27 Hen. 8 c. 4 & c. 15.
81
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and civilian judges.84 By statute, they proceeded according to common law
procedures: indictment by a grand jury and verdict by a petit jury.85
Leading legal historians have missed the implications of this statute
for the development of due process. The principal contemporary textbook
on the history of the common law is, at best, imprecise: “[t]he admiralty
courts dealt with maritime affairs, including crimes committed on the high
seas . . . .”86 Theodore Plucknett was less accurate when he concluded that
the Acts of 1536 “inaugurated the new policy of strengthening Admiralty
by confirming its jurisdiction over crime committed on the seas, and
permitting trial by jury.”87 To the contrary, the statute all but divested
admiralty of control over crimes committed on the high seas. Instead of
trial by admiralty judge according to the civil law, ad hoc commissions
comprised of common law and civil law judges would preside over grand
and petit juries and would proceed according to the common law.88 It is true
that the cases “arose at admiralty” in the sense that, because the facts
giving rise to the suits occurred on the high seas, the case was within the
admiralty jurisdiction. More importantly, however, the Acts of 1535 and
1536 effectively extended Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection to
those accused of crimes on the high seas.89 Due process had set sail.
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28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536) (providing that each commission shall include the Lord High Admiral, a
delegate, or the Warden of the Cinque Ports, “and three or four such other substantial persons as shall
be named by the lord chancellor for the time being”); see also Rex v. Dawson, 13 How. St. Tr. 451, 451
(1696) (commission included Doctor Charles Hedges (President and Judge of the Admiralty), Sir John
Holt (Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench), Sir George Treby (Lord Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas), Sir Edward Ward (Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer), three other judges of the King’s Bench,
a justice of the Common Pleas, and a baron of the Exchequer, along with sundry knights “named in the
said Commission”); Trial of William Kidd, 14 How. St. Tr. 123 (1701) (similar).
85
See 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536); see also SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77 (5th ed.
1716) (“The Stat. 28 H. 8 alters not the offence; but it remains only an offence by the Civil Law: and
therefore a pardon of all Felonies doth not discharge it: but it gives a trial by the course of the Common
Law.”).
86
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 196 (2009) (citing George F.
Steckley, Collisions, Prohibitions, and the Admiralty Court in Seventeenth-Century London, 21 LAW &
HIST. REV. 41, 42–43 (2003)).
87
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 662 (5th ed. 1956).
88
M.J. Prichard, Crime at Sea: Admiralty Sessions and the Background to Later Colonial
Jurisdiction, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 43, 44–45 (1984).
89
See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 111
(London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1628) (describing piracy as acts occurring at sea “which by an act of
Parliament are to be enquired of, heard, and determined according to the course of the common law, as
if they had been done upon the land”). Professor Burgess has argued that the Crown and Parliament
wrestled over authority to define and punish piracy in the early sixteenth to late seventeenth centuries,
with Parliament taking the side of the common law courts and the Crown taking the side of the
admiralty court. See DOUGLAS R. BURGESS, JR., THE POLITICS OF PIRACY 18–22 (2014). By the
eighteenth century, anyway, it appears that British piracy suppression was regulated entirely by statute.
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By the late eighteenth century, Blackstone could confidently assert
that pirates were entitled to “the common law of the land.”
Formerly [piracy] was only cognizable by the admiralty courts, which proceed
by the rules of the civil law. But it being inconsistent with the liberties of the
nation that any man’s life should be taken away, unless by the judgment of his
peers or the common law of the land, the statute 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15
established a new jurisdiction for this purpose, which proceeds according to
the course of the common law . . . .90

Blackstone here references Magna Carta’s famed “law of the land”
provision,91 which became the textual origin of the English and American
constitutional guarantee that the government may deprive someone of life,
liberty, or property, only with “due process of law.”92 English common
lawyers had long equated the “law of the land” provision with “due
process,” and the early American state and federal constitutional traditions
treated those legal requirements interchangeably.93 From the standpoint of
late eighteenth-century English and American readers, Blackstone’s
summary of the constitutional limits on the punishment of piracy could not
have been more clear: pirates and others who committed offenses on the
high seas were entitled to due process of law.
C.   The Colonial Exception
At the same time, Americans would have been keenly aware that
Blackstone was writing about the rights enjoyed only by those tried in
Britain. Pirates were not entitled to a common law trial in the British
colonies. In 1699, Parliament provided that “piracy, robbery, or felony
upon the sea” could be tried in the colonies by a special commission at sea

See Prichard, supra note 88, at 57 (discussing the background of a 1699 statute authorizing the trial of
piracy in the colonies by “inquisitorial procedure, not by jury”).
90
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *71.
91
For commentary and sources, see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1682–85 (“Chapter
29 of Magna Carta provided that ‘[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed,
banished, or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers [or/and] by the law of
the land.’”).
92
See id. at 1682–92. On the importance of the “myth” of the Great Charter for “all the
[seventeenth century] forces of liberalism” and English and American constitutionalism in general, see
PLUCKNETT, supra note 87, at 25.
93
See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50
(photo. reprint 2004) (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642) (equating Chapter 29 of Magna Carta
with 28 Edw. 3 c.3 (1354), which first articulated due process as a limit on governmental deprivations);
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1714 (discussing Hamilton’s equation of “law of the land”
and “due process” as limits on state legislatures).
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or land that proceeded according to the civil law.94 The statute did not alter
the common law protections for those tried in Britain under the Act of
1536; it applied only abroad.95 The point was to provide a “strict and more
easy way” to suppress the pirates that were harassing British shipping
interests near the colonies.96 The statute shows that Parliament did not
hesitate to depart from common law protections for pirates for the sake of
expediency.97 (Parliament was not, of course, subject to a written
constitution that it could not change by ordinary statute.)98 Free of “the
obstructionism of the colonial courts,”99 British officers prosecuted dozens
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An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 Will. 3 c. 7, reprinted in
3 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 17, at 25 (noting that in 1684 England determined
that under existing law “colonial courts lacked the jurisdiction to try pirates”); Peter T. Leeson,
Rationality, Pirates, and the Law: A Retrospective, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1219, 1222–24 (2010).
95
2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA: A.D. 1649–1767, at xx
(Marsden ed., Navy Records Society 1916) [hereinafter 2 LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA]. There seems
to have been some confusion among British lawyers about whether the 1536 act and the 1699 act could
be enforced, according to their respective procedural requirements, in the colonies. In 1718, an
Admiralty Session in South Carolina tried William Bonnett and others for offenses under the Act of
1536 and adhered to its procedural requirements. The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet, and Thirty-three
others, at the Court of Vice-Admiralty, at Charles-Town, in South-Carolina, for Piracy (1718), in
15 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1231 (David Jardine ed, 1812). Two years
later Richard West delivered an opinion to the lords commissioners of trade and plantations, arguing
that “the statute of Henry the eighth does not extend to the West Indies.” Richard West, Opinion on the
Admiralty Jurisdiction, in the Plantations (June 20, 1720), in OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON
VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 200, 204 (George Chalmers ed., 1814).
96
11 Will. 3 c. 7; see Prichard, supra note 88 at 57.
97
See Quelch Trial, 14 How. St. Tr. 1067, 1073–74 (1704) (statement of Paul Dudley, AttorneyGeneral of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay). In Quelch, the first trial under the Act of 1700,
Attorney-General Dudley is reported to have made inconsistent statements about the rights of pirates.
After arguing that one who captures pirates “may expose them immediately to punishment, by hanging
them at the mainyard,” id. at 1073, he acknowledged the protections afforded to pirates under the piracy
statutes of Henry VIII, and discussed the new Act of 1699 as a modest departure from those
longstanding rules, see id. at 1074. I think his assertion about hanging pirates at the mainyard is best
understood either as an argument about the rights of captors to immediately execute judgment on pirates
in a state of nature or as a rhetorical flourish designed to soften the blow of the Act of 1699 as a
departure from the protections of the common law. “Besides,” he added, “the late statute [the Act of
1699] hath appointed such commissioners, as will take care to do equal justice to the prisoner on the
one hand, and to the crown and allies of England on the other.” Id. at 1074. On the Quelch prosecution,
see BURGESS, supra note 89, at 210–213.
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See generally J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1955)
(discussing different ideas about limits on parliamentary power in the 1700s). By the time of the
Revolution, it was widely accepted that Parliament was sovereign, its lawmaking power beyond
constraint. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *90–91; 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 94 (1978).
99
See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 89, at 210.
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of pirates in the North American colonies by special commissions
according to the civil law.100
Furthermore, British practice under the Act of 1699 confirms that
while Parliament could depart from its prior decisions, the prosecution of
pirates was nonetheless subject to the requirements of municipal law.
Apparently, in 1720 the King’s commanders and naval officers queried
whether they could be commissioned to try pirates “at any place on the
high seas at large,” rather than in a colonial port.101 The Crown’s law
officers concluded that the statute of Henry VIII had affirmatively divested
the admiralty of jurisdiction over the prosecution of pirates and required
their prosecution in England “by the common course of the laws of the
land.”102 The Act of 1699 departed from this for pirates captured in the East
or West Indies, allowing trial “in some colony or plantacon [sic] in the
parts where they are taken.”103 The officers concluded, however, that “the
intent” of the Act of 1699 was to require coordination between the captors
(usually naval officers) and officers “in some plantacons” or
of some English factory, where, or on the sea adjoyning thereto, such
commission should be executed, and that a certain place should be specially
appointed in such commission for the execution thereof, which will not be
complyed with by a commission to be executed in any place at large upon the
sea.104

Such a commission, they concluded, “ought not by law to be granted.”105
The British tradition the Americans inherited was that the prosecution of
offenses at sea, by whatever procedure, was subject to the specific
requirements of municipal law.
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See, e.g., The Trial of Eight Persons Indicted for Piracy &c (Boston, B. Green for John
Edwards, 1718); The Trials of Five Persons for Piracy, Felony and Robbery (Boston, T. Fleet for S.
Gerrish, 1726); An Account of the Pirates, with Divers of Their Speeches, Letters, &c., and a Poem
Made by One of Them: Who Were Executed at Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1723 (Newport, 1723)
reprinted in 7 R.I. HIST. MAG., 1886-87, at 259 (recounting the execution of twenty-six pirates who had
resisted arrest and then surrendered on the high seas); The Tryals of Sixteen Persons for Piracy, &c.
Four of Which Were Found Guilty, and the Rest Acquitted (Boston, Joseph Edwards, 1726); An Account
of the Trial of Joseph Andrews for Piracy and Murder (New York, 1769) (vice admiralty trial and
execution in New York); see also BURGESS, supra note 89, at 222–24 (describing several trials for
piracy in the early 1700s).
101
Opinion of the Law Officers as to the Validity of a Commission to Try Pirates Anywhere on the
Sea, Addressed to Commanders and Officers of H.M. Ships (1720), in 2 LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA,
supra note 95, at 253.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 254.
105
Id.
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Americans, for their part, resented trial by colonial vice-admiralty
courts when the defendant would have been entitled to trial by jury
according to the common law in England (most notably in cases arising
under the Stamp Act).106 As we shall see, Congress never attempted to
follow Parliament’s lead by authorizing the trial of pirates by an
extraordinary legal process. Throughout the early years of the federal
republic, the U.S. commitment to due process for pirates, wherever in the
world they were apprehended, stood in stark contrast to the British
approach of trying them by the closest possible specially commissioned
court. The difference was the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers, and
its requirement of due process of law.
D.   The United States Joins the Nations
1.   The War for Independence
During the War for Independence, Americans became familiar with
how a nation’s “municipal” or domestic law could determine the boundary
between lawful privateering and piracy. Privateers played a crucial role in
the war. From the earliest days, American merchants fitted out their ships
for reprisals against British merchants.107 By one estimate in the House of
Lords, American privateers “captured or destroyed” over 700 ships with
cargoes “worth over ten million dollars,”108 or well over three times the
number of ships taken by the Continental Navy.109 “Over the course of the
War, 1,697 privateer ships manned by 58,400 men roamed the seas.”110
Spurred by a blend of patriotism and a quest for fortune, American
privateers converted the wealth of British imperial trade into the “old
money” of the eastern seaboard.111
All of this was entirely lawful—from the Americans’ perspective.
Midway through the war—as American privateers harassed British ships in
106

See 1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 52
(2003); see also 1 GOEBEL, supra note 98, at 52; Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial
Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 334–35 (1996); J. Franklin Jameson, The
Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 1775–1789, at 5 (1889); David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality:
The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 459, 460–61
(1959); Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1720 (2009).
107
See 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 371 (1775).
108
EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS, at viii–ix (1899); see also
Deirdre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The Revolutionary War Prize Cases and the Origins of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 477, 487 n.38 (2015).
109
Mask & MacMahon, supra note 108, at 487.
110
Id. at 488.
111
See ROBERT H. PATTON, PATRIOT PIRATES 115 (2008); Mask & MacMahon, supra note 108, at
488.
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the Irish Sea, the North Sea, and elsewhere in Europe—Britain declined to
treat captured American privateers as prisoners of war. In 1777, Parliament
enacted The Pirate Act, which authorized the Crown “to secure and detain
persons charged with, or suspected of, the crime of high treason committed
in North America, or on the high seas, or the crime of piracy.”112 Britain did
not recognize America as a sovereign state, so it likewise did not recognize
Congress’s authority to authorize privateers. Without authority, the
privateers were pirates. Britain’s decision illustrates the degree to which a
nation’s view of the legality of captures at sea depended on its own
municipal law, which in some cases depended on its own political interests.
Indeed, after its alliance with the United States, France allowed Benjamin
Franklin to sit as an admiralty judge in prize cases brought into French port
by American privateers.113 Ultimately George III’s strategy of treating
American rebels as common criminals proved unpopular and eroded
support for the costly war at home.114
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Continental Congress tried to
ensure that American privateers complied with the law of nations, acting
within the authority of their commissions and receiving the prize to which
they were lawfully due. To this end, Congress passed a series of resolves
that lodged appellate jurisdiction over state prize courts in a
congressionally appointed court that became progressively more stable and
independent.115 The rebels’ experience with this court ultimately provided
the basis for the Constitution’s delegation of admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts.116
2.   The Articles of Confederation
Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States took halting
steps toward what would ultimately be the Constitution’s structural
arrangement for adjudicating cases arising on the high seas. The Articles of
Confederation formally delegated much of the new federation’s “external
sovereignty” to Congress.117 Article IX gave Congress power to “appoint[ ]
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and
establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all
112

17 Geo. 3 c. 9 (1777). The statute was extended annually until January 1, 1783. See 18 Geo. 3 c.
1 (1778); 19 Geo. 3 c. 1 (1779); 20 Geo. 3 c. 5 (1780); 21 Geo. 3 c. 2 (1781); 22 Geo. 3 c. 1 (1782).
113
PETRIE, supra note 64 at 62.
114
See generally E. GORDON BOWEN-HASSELL ET AL., SEA RAIDERS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2003); RICHARD BUEL JR., IN IRONS (1998).
115
See GOEBEL, supra note 98, at ch. 4 (discussing this development).
116
See generally id. (discussing the initial creation of appellate jurisdiction based on the appeals
court for cases of capture).
117
See Penhallow v. Doane’s Admin’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 91 (1795).
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cases of capture.”118 Rather than establishing such courts, however,
Congress passed an ordinance that delegated jurisdiction in piracy cases to
courts to be created by the states.119 Many states enacted such statutes,120 but
the practice under them is unclear. Upon motion by James Madison,
Congress considered, and ultimately rejected, the idea of appointing the
judges of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture to also try cases of
piracy.121
III.   THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Based on their experience during the War for Independence and under
the Articles of Confederation, the constitutional framers understood that the
exercise of power over “all matters and questions touching the law of
nations”122 needed to be uniform, predictable, and controlled by the
institutions responsible for discharging the nation’s duties.123 The Framers
accordingly consolidated power over foreign affairs in the federal
government. Section A provides a brief overview of how the Constitution
delegated authority over these issues among the three federal departments.
Section B considers the sparse historical evidence about the drafting history
of the Define and Punish Clause of Article I, Section 8. I argue that the
framers most likely intended to give Congress broad power to define and
punish crimes on the high seas and against the law of nations without
incorporating limits on that power from the definition of piracy and crimes
under the law of nations. Section C summarizes the original understanding
of due process. Contrary to the contemporary understanding, which sorts
due process into “procedural,” “jurisdictional,” and “substantive” rights,
Section C shows that early Americans understood due process to require
that deprivations of “life, liberty, or property” be according to law. This

118

Id; see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 283 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (June 18, 1787) (Madison) (explaining that at the Philadelphia
convention, Hamilton listed “cases of piracy” as an example where the federal government already
exercised authority over individuals).
119
19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 354–56 (Apr. 5, 1781).
120
See, e.g., 5 STAT. AT LARGE OF S.C. (Feb. 27, 1788); MASS ACTS AND RESOLVES, Jan. Sess.
1783, c. 10.
121
GOEBEL, supra note 98, at 173.
122
13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 281–84 (Mar. 5, 1779) (letter from Congress to
the states).
123
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (“[T]he United States had, by
taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations, and it was their
interest as well as their duty to provide that those laws should be respected and obeyed . . . .”); see also
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.) (“When the United States declared its
independence, it was bound to receive the law of nations in its modern state of purity and refinement.”).
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would include compliance with the constitutional separation of powers and
applicable court procedures.
A.   Structural Overview
The Constitution distributes authority over matters that touch on the
nation’s rights and responsibilities under the law of nations, including law
enforcement abroad. Seeing the big picture provides context for
understanding early discussion and practice relevant to the extraterritorial
reach of due process. Article I gives Congress power to make law that
reaches beyond U.S. territory. Most obviously based on the text alone, it
gives Congress power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”124
and “[t]o . . . make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”125
Congress has also asserted power to make law governing private conduct
on the high seas under the Foreign Commerce Clause, among others.126
Article II provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”127 It does not have a territorial limitation; apparently
the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is
coterminous with the law. Article III extends “[t]he judicial Power” “to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”128 and provides that “[t]he
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”129
Article III expressly contemplates that crimes may be committed outside of
a state and provides that in those cases “the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”130

124

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
126
See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
252 (1803).
127
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
128
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This power was, according to James Wilson, “proper and unexceptionable
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 41, at 445–46 (Wilson); see id. (pointing to the “ample experience we
have had in the courts of admiralty with regard to captures”). The Virginia, New Jersey, and Hamilton
plans all would have given power to federal courts over cases of piracy and captures at sea.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 22 (May 29) (Madison); id. at 28 (May 29) (Madison,
Paterson); id. at 211 (June 12) (Journal); id. at 244 (June 15) (Madison); id. at 292 (June 18) (Madison).
129
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
130
Id. In the Crimes Act of 1790, Congress provided that the trial of crimes committed outside any
state shall be in the state where the defendant is brought or may be found. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9,
§ 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14.
125
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B.   The Define and Punish Power
Section 8 of Article I gives Congress authority to “define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”131 The Framers
discussed several ways to write this clause. They appeared to agree about
what they wanted it to mean; the question was how to avoid
misunderstanding. The first draft said that Congress would “declare” the
law and punishment for piracies and felonies on the high seas.132 Madison
and Randolph, however, argued that “felony at common law is vague” and
“defective” and, therefore, needed more clarity. Casting about for
alternative formulas, they rejected “foreign law,” which they argued
“should [not] be a standard farther than is expressly adopted”133 and “the
laws of the states” because they lacked uniformity.134 During the ratification
debates, Madison defended the generality of the final text with essentially
the same arguments that he and Randolph had made in Philadelphia.135
Besides this, and the light discussion about how best to give the federal
courts jurisdiction over piracy and other cases arising on the high seas,136
the constitutional framers and ratifiers had little to say about those
crimes.137
131

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 137, 143 (July 24–26) (Committee of Detail, IV)
(Randolph’s hand); id. at 163, 168 (July 24–26) (Committee of Detail, IX) (Wilson’s hand); id. at 614
(Sept. 14) (Madison).
133
Id. at 316 (Aug. 17) (Madison); see id. at 312–13 (Aug. 17) (Journal) (recording the votes).
134
Id. at 314, 316 (Aug. 17) (Madison).
135
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). In his essay, Madison appeared to depart from
the arguments he made in Philadelphia in a couple of respects. The most important, and most puzzling,
is that he opened his discussion of the Define and Punish Clause by asserting that “[t]he provision of the
federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of
courts for the trial of these offences.” Id. This argument does not square with the text of the Clause,
which gives Congress power to “define and punish” those crimes, and it is also manifestly contrary to
the rest of Madison’s argument about the Clause. Madison goes on to discuss the importance of giving
Congress power to define felonies on the high seas because there was no standard definition. Id. The
second possible departure from his position in Philadelphia is his vague assertion that “[t]he definition
of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative
definition of them is found in most municipal codes.” Id. This reads as though Madison was ambivalent
about whether the power to define piracies was “necessary and proper.” Id. Both of these somewhat
strange arguments can be attributed to a desire during the ratification debates to soft-pedal Congress’s
power to create new crimes.
136
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 135 (Committee of
Detail, III) (introducing admiralty jurisdiction); id. at 146–47 (Committee of Detail, IV) (same); id. at
157 (Committee of Detail, VII) (which still includes specific provision of jurisdiction over “all Cases of
Capture from an Enemy—in all Cases of Piracies and Felonies on the high Seas”); id. at 172–73
(Committee of Detail, IX) (consolidating the specific provisions into “all Cases of Admiralty and
Maritime Jurisdiction”); id. at 186 (Aug. 6) (Madison) (same); id. at 432 (Aug. 27) (Mason) (same).
137
See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1160
(1833) (stating that the Clause received little “serious” attention at Philadelphia); Eugene Kontorovich,
132
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Given the English background, the language of the clause likely
reflects the framers’ understanding that “piracy,” though sometimes
reduced in both English law and the law of nations to “robbery on the high
seas,” could also refer to other acts on the high seas made criminal by a
nation’s municipal law.138 The provision gives Congress power to define
not only “piracy” but “Piracies,” suggesting that there are a variety of
offenses that might qualify as piracy. Contrast this provision, for instance,
with the Treason Clause, which incorporates a particular definition of
treason from English law and forbids Congress and the federal courts from
expanding that definition.139 The Define and Punish Clause seems
calculated to give Congress maximum discretion over the definition and
punishment of piracy.
The additional power to “define and punish” “[f]elonies committed on
the high Seas” creates something of a puzzle. At common law, a felony was
defined as a crime punishable by attainder. Only a common law court had
the authority to impose that punishment, and so only a common law court
could try a felony. Crimes committed on the high seas were within the
admiralty jurisdiction, though under the Act of 1536 they were tried “by the
course of the common law.”140 The Act of 1536 did not make crimes on the
high seas felonies; rather, it made anything that would be a felony on land a
crime if committed on the high seas.141 Pirates and others convicted under
the Act of 1536 were not subject to attainder.142 The power to define and
punish “felonies committed on the high seas,” therefore, appears to be a
thoroughly modern, and thoroughly American, locution. In my view, the
best reading of the clause is that the framers meant to give Congress wide
latitude to define and punish crime on the high seas without being moored
to an existing definition, whether under the law of nations, the common
law, or another nation’s statute law.143
The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 150, 159
(2009) (“The Define and Punish Clause was among the least controversial in the Constitution.”); see
also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, supra note 126, at 163.
138
See CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS DISSERTATIO 44 (Ralph Van Deman
Magoffin trans., Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1744) (listing the offenses considered piracy in the
Netherlands); 2 WOODDESON, supra note 73, at 431–35 (discussing the English law of piracy).
139
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” (emphasis added)). See
generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES, at ch. 4 (1945)
(explaining how the framers crafted Article III’s definition of treason based on English law).
140
28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536).
141
See HALE, supra note 85, at 77.
142
Id.
143
But see Kontorovich, supra note 137, at 167. Professor Eugene Kontorovich argues that the
Define and Punish Clause’s enumeration of “piracies” and “other felonies on the high seas” separately
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As discussed briefly above, the Constitution allocates other powers to
Congress, the Executive, and the courts that pertain to the exercise of
authority abroad. The framing and ratification debates reveal little about
how Americans understood their application to conduct abroad.
Accordingly, this Article considers them in turn as they are relevant to
understanding the early practice and as that practice reflects the founding
generation’s understanding of their extraterritorial application.
C.   Due Process of Law
The Constitution provided for a government of limited powers, and it
divided and limited those powers in ways that would have been understood
to overlap with the requirement of due process of law.144 But the
Constitution’s opponents were still skeptical of vesting such power in a
centralized government without placing further restrictions on it.145 To
satisfy them, at James Madison’s insistence, the First Congress enacted and
the states ratified the Bill of Rights.146
Tucked into the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause provides
that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”147 On its face, the provision applies to any
governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property, by any government
agent, against any one and anywhere.148
Evaluating the application of due process abroad during the early
years of the republic requires first approximating the founding generation’s
understanding of due process of law. It was in some ways quite different
from the due process doctrines that the Supreme Court has articulated in
the modern era.

may be read to incorporate the law of nations distinction between piracy as a universal crime and
felonies as a municipal crime requiring a nexus to the proscribing sovereign. I disagree. While the
Framers understood that every nation had a right and duty to punish piracy, they also understood that
every nation had done so uniquely according to its own municipal law. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note
16, at *71–72 (discussing the English law of piracy); VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 138, at 44 (listing
the offenses considered piracy by the Netherlands).
144
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1717–20.
145
See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 51 (2010); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 143
(1996).
146
See MAIER, supra note 145, at 446–52.
147
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
148
See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 36, at 257 nn.160−61 (citing to scholars who acknowledge that the
clause’s text appears to provide for global and universal protection).
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Scholars agree that through the Antebellum Era “due process of law”
had a core meaning.149 Due process prohibited the government from
depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property” without the application of
standing law by a court proceeding according to the appropriate
procedures.150 Moreover, as the Court put it in one of the earliest cases
arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, due
process guaranteed “[t]he enforcement of [constitutional] limitations by
judicial process.”151 Federal and state courts routinely articulated this
understanding and applied a range of constitutional provisions that were
either synonymous with or overlapped due process of law.152
For the purposes of this Article, scholarly disputes about whether the
framers understood “due process of law” to place limits on the legislature’s
ability to regulate certain forms of private conduct—today’s “substantive
due process”—are beside the point.153 All agree that, at a minimum, due
process was understood to require what Chancellor James Kent called “law
in its regular course of administration through courts of justice”154 and what

149

See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1676 n.5 (collecting sources that discuss the core
meaning of due process as a prohibition on unlawful deprivations of rights). But see id. at n.6
(collecting sources that argue that due process also entailed “substantive” or natural rights).
150
Id. at 1729 nn.245−46, 1733 n.274 (collecting cases).
151
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884) (noting further that judicial enforcement “is the
device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of individuals and minorities, as well against
the power of numbers, as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of lawful
authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force of the government”); see also 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 16 at *141–42 (discussing the relationship between English legal protections
against unlawful deprivations of life, liberty, or property and the “third subordinate right of every
Englishman [which] is that of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries”).
152
See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536; Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 276 (1855); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 553 (1852); Chapman & McConnell,
supra note 19, at 1714–16 (discussing Hamilton’s use of “due Process of law” in the New York
legislature); id. at 1727–29 (analyzing antebellum state cases); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 429 (2010) (noting that “law of the land” was
understood to be synonymous with “due process of law”); see also COKE, supra note 93, at 50.
153
Compare, e.g., CHESTER ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 351–55 (1997) (citing antebellum cases protecting natural rights), Frederick Mark
Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) (arguing that “law” in “due
process of law” was understood to refer to an act that complies with natural law), and Williams, supra
note 152, at 411–12 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Fifth Amendment, was
understood to include “substantive” due process rights), with Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at
1672 (arguing that due process applied against the legislature, but not as a species of “substantive” due
process).
154
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 16 (John M. Gould ed., Boston, Little,
Brown, and Company, 1896).
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Justice Swayne called “the application of law as it exists in the fair and
regular course of administrative procedure.”155
As the next Part illustrates, it was this notion of due process that
applied to the deprivation of rights arising from federal law enforcement
abroad. Due process required the ordinary constitutional, statutory, and
common law criminal procedures before the punishment of any suspect
captured outside U.S. territory; the ordinary statutory and law of nations
procedures before the deprivation of property for a violation of U.S. law on
the high seas; and the right to sue a federal officer for the unauthorized
deprivation of rights committed outside U.S. territory. Indeed, many
captures on the high seas could give rise to all three forms of action at law;
together they could be summed up as due process of law.
IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF EARLY FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING
CONDUCT ABROAD
The following three Parts of this Article turn to early practice.
Together they show that early Americans apparently understood that all
persons suspected of violating federal law were entitled to due process of
law. The federal government could not deprive them of rights, except
according to the structural and procedural conditions required by federal
law. This applied to aliens and citizens alike, regardless of where federal
officers captured them.
This Part begins by providing an overview of the early federal law
governing private conduct abroad. The next Part focuses on criminal
punishment for conduct abroad and distinguishes it from war. The
following Part turns to civil condemnation and trespass suits against
officers arising from captures on the high seas.
A.   The Conduct Regulated
From the beginning, the federal government regulated a wide range of
conduct on the high seas. Over time it exercised more authority to reach
foreigners and conduct in foreign territory related to conduct on the high
seas, especially the capture of slaves on foreign shores. Congress enacted
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Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 127 (1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting); see also
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (“It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
16, at *44 (explaining that law is “not a transient sudden order . . . to or concerning a particular person;
but something permanent, uniform, and universal”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,
284 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690); Chapman & McConnell,
supra note 19, at 1733 n.274 (collecting cases); id. at 1729 nn.245–46 (same).
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the Crimes Act of 1790, the first federal criminal provision, before the
states had ratified the Bill of Rights.156 Five of the Act’s thirty-three
sections prohibit piracy and other felonies on the high seas.157 The broadest
provision applied to “any person or persons” who commits “murder or
robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a
county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death”;
to “any captain or mariner” who “shall piratically and feloniously run away
with [a] ship or vessel,” “or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any
pirate”; and to “any seaman” who “shall lay violent hands upon his
commander” “or shall make a revolt in the ship.”158 The provision applied
to conduct “upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of
the jurisdiction of any particular state.”159
The Crimes Act of 1790 was only the beginning. Congress continued
to enact laws prohibiting conduct outside U.S. territory. Many of them,
especially Non-Intercourse Acts and Embargoes, responded to diplomatic
and commercial changes arising from wars between European powers
(especially between Britain and France) or between a European power and
its American colonies. Others simply extended the federal government’s
control over particular practices that were unlawful during war and peace
alike, such as piracy or the slave trade.
Early extraterritorial federal regulations fell into several categories.
The first was piracy and other felonies on the high seas. This included
conduct that would have been a felony, or at least a serious crime, under
the common law had it been committed on land: theft, assault, arson, and
the like. Throughout this period Congress broadened the definition of
piracy and felonies on the high seas, reaching more conduct committed by
more persons.160 The Supreme Court agreed that Congress could extend
piracy beyond its traditional bounds with a statute clearly intended to do
so.161
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See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
See id. §§ 8–13.
158
Id. § 8.
159
Id. Congress later discussed whether it had the authority to prohibit piracy in the Chesapeake
but seemed to conclude that Virginia and Maryland likely had joint jurisdiction over the Chesapeake
and indefinitely tabled the issue. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 1007–09 (1807); 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2279
(1808).
160
See Crimes Act of 1825, ch. 65, 4 Stat.115; Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600; Piracy Act
of 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510.
161
See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (“The constitution having
conferred on congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of
the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may have
committed no particular offence against the United States.”); id. at 630 (concluding that Section 8 of the
157
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The second category of regulations comprised prohibitions on the
slave trade. The earliest law against the slave trade, enacted in 1794,162
provided for civil forfeiture. In 1800, Congress authorized the criminal
punishment of any U.S. citizen who served on a U.S. vessel “employed or
made use of in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign
country or place to another.”163 The Act of 1808 extended the civil
forfeiture provisions and authorized criminal punishment for buying a slave
imported from a foreign shore.164 The Slave Trade Act of 1818 extended
this criminal jurisdiction and made it clear that it was subject to due process
of law. Section 4 provided that any U.S. citizen or resident who “shall take
on board, receive, or transport from any of the coasts or kingdoms of
Africa, or from any other foreign place, or country, or from the sea” anyone
“in any ship, vessel, boat, or other water craft for the purpose” of selling
them as a slave shall be subject not only to forfeiture of money and ship but
imprisonment “on conviction, by due course of law.”165
The Piracy Act of 1820 expanded the definition of piracy to include
“robbery” committed “on shore” by the crew of a pirate vessel.166 The Act
also extended the definition of piracy, and the specter of capital
punishment, to those engaged in the slave trade.167 Both of these provisions
extended U.S. municipal criminal law beyond the definition of piracy under
1790 Crimes Act extended to murder, robbery, or any other offence, which committed within a county,
would be punishable with death).
162
The Constitution forbade Congress to prohibit the slave trade before 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 1. Congress could, though, discourage the slave trade by taxing it. The First Congress debated a
$10 per capita duty on slaves, shelved the proposal, and never returned to it.
163
Slave Trade Act of 1800, ch. 51, §4, 2 Stat. 70; see W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE
AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638–1870, at 80–84 (1896).
164
Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, § 2, 2 Stat 426, 426 (1807) (owners and
masters forfeit the ship); id. § 3 (aiders and abettors forfeit $20,000). The law went into effect on
January 1, 1808. Great Britain enacted a similar law after the Act of 1808 that went into effect before it.
See An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 47 Geo. III Sess. 1 c. 36. See generally PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS 133 (3d ed. 2014); Matthew E. Mason, Slavery
Overshadowed, 20 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 59 (2000) (explaining that the congressional debates, which
foreshadowed the sectionalism that would fully emerge later in the century, were overshadowed by
concern about Burr’s alleged rebellion in the southwest and the Napoleonic wars in Europe). See also
The Josefa Segunda, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 312 (1825); United States v. Preston, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 57
(1830).
165
Slave Trade Act of 1818, ch. 91, § 4, 3 Stat. 450, 451 (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 3, 6
(likewise specifying the requirement that the government follow the “due course of law”); see, e.g., The
Merino et al., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 405 (1824) (applying the Act of 1818 against U.S. citizens who
“[took] on board” slaves “in one foreign place, for the purpose of their being held to service or labour”).
166
Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, § 3, 3 Stat. 600, 601.
167
Id. § 4; see also A. H. FOOTE, THE AFRICAN SQUADRON 3 (1855) (stating in an address to the
annual meeting of the board of directors of the American Colonization Society that “the African slave
trade has been pronounced by the United States piracy only in a municipal sense—not piracy by the law
of nations”).
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the common law or the law of nations.168 And both of them expressly
conditioned criminal punishment upon “conviction . . . before the circuit
court of the United States for the district into which [the defendant] shall be
brought, or in which he shall be found.”169
The third major category of extraterritorial federal crimes involved
conduct that violated U.S. neutrality or interfered with U.S. foreign trade
policy. They included: the Neutrality Act of 1794 (made permanent in
1800);170 the Non-Intercourse Acts enacted during the Quasi-War with
France from 1798 to 1800;171 the Non-Intercourse Act of 1808 (amended
twice);172 and the non-intercourse act known as “Macon’s Bill Number 2”
of 1810 and a supplementary act.173 These statutes often blended wartime or
diplomatic concerns with the mechanisms of ordinary criminal law
enforcement: the statutory definition of a crime, the criminal punishment of
fines and/or imprisonment, the authorization of searches and seizures by
U.S. warships (either within U.S. territory or on the high seas), and
adjudication by federal courts pursuant to ordinary criminal procedures.
The U.S. government actively enforced these laws. American sailors
understood them well.174 Before 1800, the most frequently indicted federal

168

See Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817) (High Ct. Adm.) 1471 (holding that the slave trade
was not a violation of the law of nations and therefore not punishable as piracy except under the
vessel’s sovereign’s municipal law); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 118–20 (1825) (also
holding that the slave trade was not a violation of the law of nations and therefore not punishable as
piracy except under the vessel’s sovereign’s municipal law). See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE
ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES
MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977).
169
Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, §§ 3,4, 3 Stat. 600.
170
Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381–86.
171
Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7; Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613; Act of June 28,
1798, ch. 62, 1 Stat. 574; Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565; Act of May 28, 1798 ch. 48, 1 Stat.
561. See generally HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801−15, at
408–15 (1981) (discussing illegal smuggling during the “Quasi-War” with France from 1797 to 1800).
172
Non-Intercourse Act of 1808, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528, amended by Act of May 30, 1809, ch. 1,
2 Stat. 547, and Act of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 550.
173
Macon’s Bill Number 2, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 605 (1810). I am putting to one side a number of laws
that criminalized conduct that could be characterized as outside U.S. territory but that, for purposes of
this Article, are not. The United States provided ordinary due process in these cases too, but because
they may be characterized as being within U.S. territory, they are less salient for my argument. The first
include crimes by or against Indians or in Indian territory. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383
(providing for punishment of crimes committed in Indian territory); Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat.
139 (establishing penalties for crimes committed in Indian territory). The second include criminal
conduct within U.S. port or territorial waters in violation of an embargo. See Enforcement Act, ch. 33,
2 Stat. 473 (1808) (establishing penalties and forfeitures for exporting goods during embargo);
Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (laying an embargo on shipping in the U.S.).
174
AMERICAN SHIP-MASTER’S DAILY ASSISTANT, supra note 64 (including chapters on U.S. slave
trade laws and piracy law).
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crime was “assault and battery aboard ship.”175 From 1800 to 1830,
“[a]dmiralty and [m]aritime” crimes accounted for more than 30% of
federal indictments.176 In absolute numbers, 406 of the 2,718 indictments
during this period were for piracy.177 The prosecution and punishment of
extraterritorial crimes, including crimes committed by aliens, was one of
the federal government’s top priorities.
B.   The Enforcement Mechanisms: Criminal Trial and Civil Condemnation
To regulate the foregoing conduct abroad, the federal government
principally used two enforcement mechanisms—punishment after criminal
trial, and civil forfeiture after a condemnation by a federal court sitting in
admiralty. The Crimes Act of 1790, for instance, provided for criminal
punishments consisting of fines, incarceration, death, and dissection.178
Other provisions, especially trade regulations, were enforced only by bonds
(for which the owner would be liable at common law)179 and civil
forfeiture.180 Congress passed many of these regulations to enforce the
nation’s international position during a period of quasi-war. Some
regulations authorized U.S. warships to capture enemy and friendly vessels
violating neutrality acts and embargoes.181 U.S. courts handled the
condemnation proceedings arising from such captures as they would have
handled a prize case. As Justice Story explained, these captures were not
“strictly jure belli” because they were not condemnations of the vessels of
an enemy with whom the United States was formally at war; instead, they
were “public acts in the nature of captures jure belli.”182

175

HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 13.
Id. at 215.
177
Id.
178
The propriety of dissection as a punishment for those convicted of capital crimes was one of the
only aspects of the bill debated in the House. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1519 (1790). The penalty was
only carried out once—against four men arrested in Copenhagen and returned in 1818 to Boston, where
they were tried, convicted, and executed for murder and piracy. See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 134.
179
See, e.g., Speake v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 28, 35–36 (1815) (Story, J.) (holding that
a bond for more than double the value of the ship was valid because it was taken voluntarily).
180
Enforcement Act of 1809, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506; Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Embargo
Act of 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 473; Act of Jan. 9, 1808, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453; Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5,
2 Stat. 451; Second Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613 (1799); First Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 53,
1 Stat. 565 (1798); Act of June 28, 1798, ch. 62, 1 Stat. 574 (providing for distribution of prize awards);
Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561 (non-intercourse act); see also Slave Trade Act of 1794, ch. 11,
§§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 347, 349 (requiring forfeiture for violation of the Act).
181
See, e.g., Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 426, 428 (1807)
(authorizing capture of US slave traders on the high seas); Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 86, 1 Stat. 578
(authorizing capture and condemnation of any armed French vessel).
182
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1827) (Story, J.) (emphasis added).
176
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Some statutes, however, regulated the same conduct with both
mechanisms of enforcement.183 Although arising from the same conduct
abroad and the same capture, a criminal prosecution and related civil
condemnation suit would proceed entirely independently of one another.184
The criminal prosecution was in personam and usually arose under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a federal circuit court that proceeded
according to the course of the common law.185 Condemnation proceedings,
by contrast, were in rem and arose under the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of a district court that proceeded “according to the course of the
civil law.”186 In the civil suit, the owners of the captured vessel could
countersue the capturing officer for maritime trespass, i.e., for exceeding
his authority under congressional act, executive order, and the law of
nations.187
Americans appeared to believe that both enforcement mechanisms
were consistent with due process of law. The Piracy Act of 1819, for
instance, made it a crime for “any person or persons whatsoever” to
“commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations” and
authorized capital punishment “upon conviction thereof, before the circuit
court of the United States for the district into which he or they may be
brought.”188 The Act also made vessels “from which any piratical
aggression . . . shall have been first attempted or made” subject to
condemnation “after due process and trial, in any court having admiralty
jurisdiction . . . .”189 The process that was due, in other words, depended on
the case. Criminal prosecutions proceeding in personam had to be
183

See, e.g., Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, §§ 2–5, 3 Stat. 510, 512–14 (permitting seizure of any
vessel or boat that committed or attempted to commit “piratical aggression,” and permitting the
infliction of punishment on any person convicted of piracy after trial in a United States district court).
184
Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15 (“[T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand the law to be,
that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personam.”).
185
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (giving circuit courts general jurisdiction over
federal crimes); see also id. § 9 (giving district courts jurisdiction over crimes with relatively minor
punishments).
186
Id. § 9 (conferring “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction” on district courts); The Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (providing that
federal courts sitting in admiralty shall proceed according to the civil law); Glass v. Sloop Betsey,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (interpreting this jurisdiction to include “all the powers of a court of
Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court”).
187
See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37
(1800).
188
Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14, amended by Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113,
3 Stat. 600 (extending section 5 indefinitely); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153
(1820) (holding that the provision was reasonably certain).
189
Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, § 4, 3 Stat. 510, 513 (emphasis added).
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according to the common law; civil forfeiture suits in rem had to be
according to the civil law. Both forms of proceeding were understood to
amount to “due process and trial.”190
A well-known case illustrates these enforcement mechanisms.191 Off
the shore of Africa, The U.S.S. Alligator approached a vessel that appeared
to be in distress.192 After the Alligator showed the U.S. flag, the other vessel
opened fire.193 The two exchanged fire until the other vessel allowed the
U.S. captain to board and inspect her papers.194 The papers showed the
vessel to be a Portuguese merchant, The Marianna Flora; the ship’s captain
said that she fired on the U.S. ship believing her to be a pirate.195 The U.S.
captain was unsatisfied; the ship had acted like a decoy, papers are easy to
falsify, and there was no reason (other than general distrust) for the
Marianna Flora to have suspected the Alligator of piracy.196
A British man-of-war in the same circumstance almost certainly
would have sailed the vessel to a vice-admiralty court in one of the British
colonies in Africa.197 Because it was outside of England, that court would
have tried the Portuguese captain and crew for piracy and entertained a
condemnation suit.198 The Alligator did not have that option. Nor did it have
lawful authority to try the Portuguese crew itself.
Suspecting the vessel of piracy, the U.S. captain put a “prize crew”—a
detail from his own ship—on the Marianna Flora with instructions to sail
it to the U.S. for condemnation proceedings.199 The crew put the Portuguese
crew in irons and sailed to Boston. Upon arrival, the American master
libeled the Marianna Flora, seeking condemnation and sale of the ship and

190

See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855)
(holding that traditional procedures satisfied due process of law even when they were different from the
ordinary requirements of the common law).
191
See generally The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1825); The Marianna Flora, 16 F.
Cas. 736 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1822). See also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1
(1827) (Story, J.); HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 130 (discussing the libel of the brig B and the
concurrent indictment of Thomas Jones before the federal district court in Rhode Island in 1817);
Circular from Secretary of State Adams to District Attorneys (Microcopy M 40), reel 28, pp. 164–65
(May 1823) (asking for copies of proceedings “in cases of Foreign Vessels brought on suit into Port
upon charges of Piracy, aggression upon vessels of the United States; or relating to the slave trade; and
in cases of process against or trial of individual Foreigners for those offenses”).
192
The Marianna Flora, 16 F. Cas. at 736.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. at 7–8 (Blake, arguing for the respondents).
197
See supra Section II.C.
198
Id.
199
The Marianna Flora, 16 F. Cas. at 736.
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cargo and distribution of the proceeds.200 The owner counterclaimed for
damages, arguing that the captain of the Alligator had lacked probable
cause to seize the vessel in the first place, much less to sail it from Africa to
the United States for proceedings.201 Ultimately the Supreme Court
concluded that the captain, though proven wrong, was justified in capturing
and detaining the vessel because of its unusual maneuvers and its firefight
with the U.S. vessel.202 The capture and suits appeared to arise from an
unfortunate (and expensive) misunderstanding, and since it was a case of
first impression, the Court decided to let both sides go without further
costs.203
The case illustrates several points. First, the potential for maritime
misunderstandings which could precipitate international conflict provided a
powerful motivation for subjecting disputes about rights and duties on the
high seas to an independent tribunal that could carefully weigh the
evidence. These dangers were exacerbated on the high seas, where
subterfuge was commonplace.204 The law of nations had long provided
rules that all of the western powers recognized.205 The United States
followed these rules but implemented and supplemented them through its
unique municipal law—through captures authorized by Congress and
legitimized by an Article III court with jurisdiction over both piracy and
prize cases.206
Second, though a capture on the high seas could give rise to several
different legal remedies, all of them were supplied by federal courts. This
approach was inconvenient and expensive. By design, the courts lacked the
authority to respond to changing concerns about the nation’s foreign
affairs; instead, they were obligated to review captures on the high seas for
compliance with the law of nations and U.S. law. In doing so, they
extended due process to all who came within the United States’ law
enforcement jurisdiction.

200

Id.
Id.
202
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 11–12 (1825).
203
Id. at 58.
204
See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 126 (1825) (“Whether the General Ramirez,
originally the Antelope, is to be considered as the prize of a commissioned belligerent ship of war
unlawfully equipped in the United States, or as a pirate, it seems proper to make some inquiry into the
title of the claimants.” (emphasis added)).
205
See Condemnation of Prize, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 78, 79 (1797) (“[T]he rule [arising from the law
of nations] before mentioned is designed to prevent piracy and other unjust seizures on the high seas,
which it is in the interest of all nations to prevent.”).
206
See, e.g., Prize Ship and Crew, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 85, 85 (1798).
201
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V.   THE EVIDENCE FOR DUE PROCESS ABROAD
The previous Part provided an overview of early federal criminal law
enforcement abroad. This Part more carefully explores evidence showing
that all three departments of the federal government understood due
process to be a limit on federal law enforcement outside U.S. territory.
First, Congress and the courts believed that due process limited Congress’s
power to authorize punishment for crimes committed on the high seas.
Even before the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress placed due
process limits on federal criminal punishment.207 After the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, Justice Iredell acknowledged that the Constitution’s
express limits on congressional power—including the Bill of Rights’
criminal procedural protections—limited Congress’s power to “define and
punish” piracy.208 Second, the Executive Department uniformly complied
with due process in the enforcement of U.S. law abroad. The most potent
evidence of this commitment came during a period of sustained law
enforcement against pirates in Puerto Rico and Cuba.209 The United States
consistently supplied due process for foreign pirates who menaced U.S.
merchant vessels, even when doing so was extraordinarily costly. Congress
considered giving the President authority to try and punish pirates on the
spot but declined to do so for reasons that sounded in due process of law
(though Congress did not expressly cite the Fifth Amendment).210 The
piracy scourge ended only when the Spanish coerced confessions and
executed dozens of pirates captured in a joint operation with the U.S.
Navy.211 Moreover, U.S. officials consistently distinguished between the
federal government’s power to operate against criminals and its power
against foreigners who claimed sovereign status and threatened the United
States with war. Finally, U.S. courts routinely heard suits against U.S.
officers for exceeding their authority to capture a foreign vessel on the high
seas.212 Such suits mirrored common law trespass suits that many scholars
believe to have been a mechanism for enforcing constitutional rights.
A.   Congress’s Power to Authorize Punishment for Conduct Abroad
Congress and the courts believed that Congress could not authorize
punishment for conduct abroad without due process of law. The best
evidence of Congress’s constitutional understanding are the terms of the
207
208
209
210
211
212

See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.B.1.
See infra Section V.B.1.
See infra Section V.B.1.
See infra Section V.B.3.
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statutes themselves. The statutes that defined extraterritorial federal crimes
stipulated that punishment would follow conviction in a federal court. This
requirement began with the Crimes Act of 1790. The Act provides that
those “adjudged” and “convicted” of being a pirate and a felon “shall suffer
death,” stipulating that the trial for pirates “shall be in the district where the
offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.”213 The Act
made no exceptions for noncitizen defendants. Subsequent statutes
followed suit, whether they authorized punishment following a criminal
trial or civil forfeiture following a condemnation proceeding.214
Conditioning punishment on conviction in a court in a district into
which the defendant “may first be brought” provides crucial insight into the
statute’s extraterritorial reach. The statute supposes that some pirates would
be captured outside the jurisdiction of a federal court. But it nevertheless
conditions punishment of such a suspect on conviction in a federal court.
There is no plausible way to read the provision as authorizing the President
to punish pirates upon capture on the high seas. The statute required trial in
a federal court. Any executive power to punish pirates or other criminals
captured outside the United States would have to come directly from the
Constitution.215 As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, the President
never argued that the Constitution gave him power to punish criminal
suspects captured outside U.S. territory absent congressional authority.
Rather, the President understood the Executive’s authority to execute the
law abroad was subject to the terms of that law.216 Additionally, federal
courts enforced congressional limits on executive law enforcement
abroad.217
Why did Congress expressly condition criminal punishment on
conviction in an Article III court? Did Congress believe that the
Constitution did not require conviction in a federal court before criminal
punishment? The most obvious answer, I believe, is that Congress assumed
judgment to be constitutionally required before punishment, and stipulated
conviction, condemnation, or some other form of judgment to clarify the
213

Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–114.
See, e.g., Piracy Act of 1819, ch 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–514; Slave Trade Act of 1818, ch. 91,
§ 4, 3 Stat. 450, 451–52; Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 426, 428 (1807).
215
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “the executive power” in the President).
216
See, e.g., Prosecutions for Piracy, 1815, 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 185, 186 (1815) (directing district
attorney to prosecute piracy committed outside the jurisdiction of any particular state in the district
where the offender is apprehended or into which he may first be brought, and holding that it would be at
the option of the capturing vessel to carry the offender or offenders to such port or district of the United
States for trial “as was thought proper”).
217
See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (holding a U.S. captain liable for
exceeding congressional authority).
214
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applicable rules of procedure. For the Crimes Act of 1700, in particular,
there are especially good reasons to suspect that Congress specified
punishment upon conviction of pirates for clarity rather than because they
believed the issue to be a matter of discretion. Requiring federal courts to
try pirates according to the course of the common law was a departure from
recent British practice in the colonies.218 The Crimes Act of 1790 simply
returned to the procedural protections of the statute of Henry VIII that had
been enforced in England since 1536.219 The Act was drafted alongside the
Bill of Rights and went into effect before the states ratified the Bill of
Rights. The other provisions of the Crimes Act that applied to conduct
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts likewise specify that
punishment must follow conviction.220 It seems unlikely that Congress
would have thought the Bill of Rights, once ratified, would not apply to
prosecutions under the Act.
In many respects, the constitutional Framers had determined this
course of action before Congress ever convened or considered the Bill of
Rights. Article III of the Constitution vested admiralty jurisdiction in the
federal courts and required those courts to try all crimes by a jury.221 Even
if Congress had wanted to authorize punishment for piracy without the
ordinary protections of a common law trial (which was unlikely given the
nation’s antipathy to vice-admiralty courts), the Constitution gave it little
choice but to require that punishment for piracy and other felonies on the
high seas must follow conviction in an Article III court. Adding the
requirement of “due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment simply
guaranteed that courts would enforce these restrictions (and others) in
individual cases.
Justice Iredell articulated this understanding of congressional power
when he charged one of the earliest federal grand juries to consider piracy
charges. In a style typical of the day, Iredell at once elaborated on grand
themes of constitutional principle while admonishing the jurors to do their
civic duty.222 He proposed to systematically explain the Constitution’s
“restrictions on the criminal law.”223 He began with what are now
commonly understood as structural restrictions: the Suspension Clause, the
Ex Post Facto Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the jury trial rights
218

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.B.
220
See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 15, 1 Stat. 112, 114–15 (falsifying records); id. § 16
(larceny).
221
See supra Section III.A.
222
2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 386–387 (J. McRee Griffith ed., 1857).
223
Id. at 392.
219

415

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.224 Iredell explained that
these provisions were “calculated to secure . . . the invaluable possession of
personal liberty, so that it may not be unjustly sacrificed to any arbitrary
measures.”225 His instruction was a mini-treatise on the separation of
powers principles that early American courts often enforced as a
requirement of due process of law.226
Only after articulating all of these constitutional limits on the
government’s power to punish crimes in general did Iredell arrive at “the
authority of the Legislature” to “define and punish” crimes on the high
seas.227 Apparently Iredell believed the Constitution’s limits on Congress’s
power to punish crimes applied with full force to crimes, such as piracy,
committed on the high seas. Under his reasoning, it also applied with full
force to any governmental action meant to punish criminal conduct,
whether that conduct was within the jurisdiction of a federal court or not.
Rather, his reasoning extended the early understanding of due process to
any federal criminal punishment, at home or abroad.
B.   Executive Practice
Members of the Executive Department apparently believed that they
lacked authority to deprive criminal suspects of rights without a trial in an
Article III court. The most powerful evidence of this comes from the
federal government’s efforts to quell piracy in Cuba and Puerto Rico from
1815 to 1825.228 The government’s commitment to jury trial in the United
States despite its inefficiency, especially compared to how other nations
dealt with pirates, strongly suggests that Americans believed the
Constitution limited the government’s authority to punish them without due
process. During the same period, the Monroe Administration declined to
enter into a treaty with Great Britain that would have subjected U.S. sailors
to a mixed tribunal of British and American judges upon suspicion of
engaging in the slave trade, on the ground that the tribunals would not
comply with Article III.229 While U.S. officers on the high seas of course
used force against those resisting arrest,230 they never punished pirates or
224

Id. at 388–92.
Id. at 391.
226
See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1727.
227
IREDELL, supra note 222, at 392.
228
See infra Section V.B.1.
229
See infra Section V.B.2.
230
See, e.g., SOFAER, supra note 55 at 156 (citing 1 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE QUASIWAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 77 (1935)) (quoting instructions to a U.S. captain
during the Quasi-War with France: “[if] attacked by any armed Vessel . . . . To defend yourself to the
Utmost. If the Assailant strikes, examine her Papers, and if She has not a regular Commission, and then
225
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other suspects captured on the high seas without a conviction in a federal
court. In contrast, during this period, the U.S. military engaged in several
forays in Florida that deprived persons of rights without trial.231 The
difference was that the government considered them to be enemies, not
criminals.
1.   The End of the Pirates of the Caribbean
After the War of 1812, Americans got on with business—including
privateering for Spanish American colonies in revolt against Spain.
Beginning in 1815, agents of those colonies issued commissions to as many
as seventy sailors operating mostly out of New Orleans and Baltimore.232
Accepting such commissions or fitting out a privateer to cruise against a
neutral nation, such as Spain, violated U.S. neutrality laws.233 The U.S.
government tried to enforce these laws in federal court, but convictions
were hard to come by.234 A number of privateers used their licenses to prey
on Spanish (and other) ships and gained the affection of the local populace
by smuggling cargo onto the mainland and selling it at a discount.235 Others
successfully argued to juries that the practice of accepting commissions
from Spanish colonies was so open and notorious that “it was inferred that
the government purposedly connived at it.”236 Still others may have relied
in force, bring her into some Port of the United States, to be tried as a Pirate.”); GARDNER W. ALLEN,
OUR NAVY AND THE WEST INDIAN PIRATES 2–3 (1929) (recounting the defense of U.S. merchant
vessels from Haitian pirates in 1800 by Lieutenant Maley and Captain Little of the Experiment and the
Boston, respectively); id. at 84 (quoting account of the capture of Caribbean pirates by joint U.S. and
British warships in 1825).
231
See infra Section V.B.3.c.
232
HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 125–26.
233
See Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447, repealing Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 58, 3 Stat.
370, Act of June 14, 1797, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 520, and Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381; see also The
Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298 (1819) (holding that Spanish libel of ship for violating Act of 1818
must fail because the captain had a valid commission from Venezuela); 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1403–34,
1452–55 (1818) (Debates in the House of Representatives); HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 132–33.
234
See, e.g., The Case of the Fourth-of-July Privateer, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 249, 249, 252–53 (1818)
(Honorable William Wirt wrote to District Attorney Elias Glenn with instructions to prosecute under
various provisions of the Crimes Act of 1790 and neutrality acts, depending on whether the defendants
purported to hold commissions from Artigas, which the Executive had recognized as a sovereign
nation); see also HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 134–35 (the defendants were tried; one was acquitted,
the other was convicted, but judgment was arrested and the district attorney ultimately entered a nolle
prosequi).
235
The most famous of these privateer–smugglers were the Lafitte brothers in Barataria Bay,
Louisiana. See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 125. For their service in the Battle of New Orleans,
President Madison issued a proclamation granting their compatriots a full pardon for all deeds
committed before January 8, 1815. Id. For a full account of the Lafittes in Barataria Bay, Galveston,
and afterwards, see generally HEAD, supra note 61, at ch. 2.
236
HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 127 (quoting Letter from Wirt to Rush (Dec. 2, 1816), regarding
the acquittal of William Hitching and John J. Mitchell in Virginia).
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on popular support for the revolutionaries and the view that “[h]owever
irregular may have been their proceedings, it is believed they were not of
sufficient enormity to deserve the dreadful punishment of Death.”237
By the late 1810s, however, the situation had changed. The SpanishAmerican civil wars had subsided. Privateers responded to the market
change by freelancing. Increasingly, they targeted American merchant
vessels. All branches of the government responded accordingly, with the
result that the Executive had maximum authority to address the growing
crisis. As the nation’s extraterritorial criminal law enforcement expanded,
due process kept pace.
Beginning in 1818, the Executive brought a “dramatically” higher
number of cases to trial,238 and juries began to convict.239 At the same time,
Congress expanded the definition of piracy well beyond what it had been at
common law or under the Crimes Act of 1790. In 1818, the Supreme Court
interpreted “piracy” under the Crimes Act of 1790 to exclude an act by a
foreigner against a foreigner on a foreign vessel.240 Chief Justice Marshall
noted that Congress could authorize punishment of such offenders but
stated that the Court was reluctant to recognize this authorization without a
clearer statement of Congress’s intent to do so.241 Congress responded in
1819 by authorizing the punishment of anyone who committed piracy “as
defined by the law of nations” and authorizing U.S. warships and merchant
vessels acting in defense to capture them.242 Within a year, the Supreme
Court clarified that its prior holding limiting the scope of piracy under the
Act of 1790 did not apply to offenses committed by a foreigner on board a
vessel “possessed and held by pirates, or persons not lawfully sailing under
the flag of any foreign nation.”243 Furthermore, the Court also upheld the
237

Id. at 129–30; id. (“The American people almost universally held the attitude expressed by the
editors.”); see also United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440 (C.C.D. Va. 1817) (No. 15,429)
(Marshall, C.J.) (jury acquitted of piracy under the Crimes Act of 1790, probably at least in part because
the robbery would not have been punishable by death had it occurred on land).
238
HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 134; see FRANCIS B. C. BRADLEE, PIRACY IN THE WEST INDIES
AND ITS SUPPRESSION 13–17 (1923) (recounting the capture of forty pirates sent to Charleston for trial).
239
See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 134.
240
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 633–34 (1818).
241
Id. at 630–31 (“The constitution having conferred on congress the power of defining and
punishing piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates,
although they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence against the United
States.”).
242
Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510.
243
United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 417 (1820) (Washington, J.); see also United
States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 153 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (distinguishing the facts in
Palmer, holding that “the act of the 30th of April, 1790, does extend to all persons on board all vessels
which throw off their national character by cruizing piratically and committing piracy on other
vessels”).
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“law of nations” provision under the Act of 1819 as a proper exercise of
Congress’s “define and punish” power.244 In 1820, Congress indefinitely
extended the “law of nations” provision,245 further expanded the definition
of piracy under U.S. law to clearly reach anyone who commits robbery on
any vessel,246 and broadened the definition of piracy under U.S. law to any
U.S. citizen engaged in the international slave trade.247 This expansion of
U.S. criminal law never outran due process—even as applied to the law
enforcement operations of the U.S. military on the high seas, foreign
waters, and foreign soil.
By the early 1820s, the pirates grew bolder. Tales of pirate
depredations against U.S. merchant and war vessels multiplied.248 The
Cuban and Puerto Rican pirates grew increasingly ruthless and violent,
allegedly dispatching whole crews of American merchantmen, apparently
to avoid having to transfer them to a place of safety.249 The pirates would
retreat to sparsely populated coasts of Cuba when given chase.250 Their
bases were on land, up rivers and inlets that larger war vessels could not
navigate, well within Spanish territory.251
In 1822, after repeated stories of violence had turned U.S. sentiment
against the pirates of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the House Committee on
Naval Affairs considered whether Congress should authorize the Navy to
punish pirates upon capture. The Committee had been asked whether (1) it
244

United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) (Story, J.). At the trial, Chief Justice
Marshall and Judge St. George Tucker disagreed. Marshall charged the jury that “it was impossible that
‘the Act of Congress could apply to any case, if it did not to this’ yet the standard referred to by the Act
of Congress must be admitted to be so vague as to admit some doubt. The writers on the law of nations
give us no definition of the crime of piracy.” HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 140.
245
Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, § 2, 3 Stat. 600.
246
Id. § 3.
247
Id. § 5.
248
Pirate attack survival tales appears to have been a popular subgenre. See, e.g., BARNABAS
LINCOLN, NARRATIVE OF THE CAPTURE, SUFFERINGS AND ESCAPE OF CAPT. BARNABAS LINCOLN AND
HIS CREW (1822).
249
38 ANNALS OF CONG. 151–52 (1822) (Sen. Johnson of Louisiana stating that “we hear almost
every day of recent acts of piracy” including the murder of whole crews, especially in Cuba).
250
See Act of Dec. 20, 1822, ch.1, 3 Stat. 720; 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 29, 32–33, 35, 277–78, 287,
314, 331–32, 348–49; Senate Naval Committee Correspondence, No. 215 (Dec. 12, 1822), in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, NAVAL AFFAIRS 822 [hereinafter NAVAL AFFAIRS]; BRADLEE, supra note
238, at 29–33 (discussing the events precipitating a more concerted American effort to suppress the
pirates in Cuba).
251
See Letter from Monroe to Senate, No. 213 (Dec. 9, 1822), in 1 NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note
250, at 815 (asking for “a particular kind of force, capable of pursuing them into the shallow waters to
which they retire, effectually to suppress them”); BRADLEE, supra note 238, at 33 (quoting an article
from the Baltimore Chronicle asserting that “[i]f the Spanish Government is unable to drive the pirates
from their strongholds in Cuba, the Chronicle suggests the necessity of occupying the island with
American forces for that purpose”).
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would be expedient “to authorize the destruction of persons and vessels
found at sea, or in uninhabited places, making war upon the commerce of
the United States without any regular commission” and (2) whether “it
would be inconsistent with public law or general usage to give any
authority to destroy pirates and piratical vessels found at sea or in
uninhabited places.”252 The second question is ambiguous. While “general
usage” almost certainly referred exclusively to the practices of other
nations, “public law” could have been understood to refer more broadly to
any public law, whether treaty, statute, or Constitution.253 It is unclear
where the request originated, but it may well have been the Executive
Department. The request certainly reflects the President’s goal to do
everything possible to end piracy against American vessels. At the same
time, though, the second request reflects a sensitivity to the legal
parameters of doing so.
The Committee rejected the proposal. Its legal reasons were likewise
at a very high level of abstraction.
The committee are of [the] opinion that it would be dangerous, and productive
of great evil, to vest in the commanders of our public vessels an authority to
treat as pirates, and punish without trial, even such persons as above described
[murderous pirates off the coasts of Cuba and Puerto Rico]. It is not necessary
for the accomplishment of the object in view that such an authority should be
given, and it is essentially due to the rights of all, and the principles of ‘public
law and general usage,’ that the consequences and punishment of piracy
should follow only a legal adjudication of the fact.254

The Committee did not cite the U.S. Constitution. Given its
ambiguous mandate, perhaps this is unsurprising. But the Committee’s
reasoning seemed far more consistent with the notion that pirates were
entitled to due process of law, rather than simply to the protections of the
law of nations. It is doubtful that the law of nations required “that the
consequences and punishment . . . of piracy should follow only a legal
adjudication of fact,”255 and it certainly did not require a grand jury
indictment and jury trial.256 This sounds much more like Blackstone’s view
that pirates were entitled to the “common law of the land,” incorporated
252

Additional Number of Small Vessels to be Employed for the Suppression of Piracy, No. 207
(Mar. 2, 1822), in 1 NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 250, at 787–88.
253
See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1827) (Story, J.) (referring to captures at sea
pursuant to neutrality and embargo statutes as “public acts in the nature of captures jure belli”).
254
Suppression of Piracy, 1 NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 250, at 788.
255
Id. But see VATTEL, supra note 34, bk. I, ch. XIX, § 233 (“[A]s it is proper to have criminals
regularly convicted by a trial in due form of law, this is a second reason for delivering up malefactors of
that class [including pirates] to the states where their crimes have been committed.” (emphasis added)).
256
See infra Section V.D (discussing British and French practices).
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into U.S. practice, than to Cicero’s well-known rhetorical trope that pirates
were the enemies of all mankind.257 In any case, the U.S. Navy would
continue to enforce the laws against piracy according to due process of law.
The instructions of Smith Thompson, Secretary of Navy, to
Commodore Porter, the officer in command of the West Indies Squadron,
are illustrative. Thompson authorized Porter to pursue pirates into the
settled areas of Cuba “[to] aid[] the local authorities or people” in
apprehending the suspects.258 Porter was authorized to pursue suspects “into
the unsettled parts of the islands or foreign territory” only with the tacit
permission of the local authority.259 Upon capture, Thompson instructed
Porter to “deliver them over to the proper authority, to be dealt with
according to law” and to “furnish such evidence as shall be in [his] power
to prove the offense alleged against them.”260 In the event that the local
authorities declined to prosecute, Porter was not authorized to try or punish
the suspects himself but rather must “keep them safely and securely on
board some of the vessels under your command and report without
delay . . . the particular circumstances of such cases” to the Department of
the Navy.261 In such a case, the government would decide whether to
prosecute the suspects and whether to hold Spain responsible under the law
of nations for declining to do so. The orders balanced the U.S. commitment
to due process of law and respect for Spain’s territorial sovereignty.
After Congress had declined to authorize the Navy to kill pirates upon
capture, they grew bolder.262 In response, merchantmen from Maine and
New York petitioned Congress to purchase the appropriate array of ships
and adequately fund the Navy to protect their shipping interests.263
In January of 1825, President Monroe made an appeal for authority to
pursue the pirates “to the settled as well as the unsettled parts of the
island,” to engage in reprisals “on the property of the inhabitants,” and to
257

See RUBIN, supra note 61, at 14–19, 17 n.61 (discussing the origin of the phrase “hostes humani
generis”).
258
Commodore Porter’s Orders, Navy Dep’t (Feb. 1, 1823), in ALLEN, supra note 230, at 101–02.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Suppression of Piracies in the West Indies, No. 373 (May 19, 1824), in 5 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 343 [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS]; 1 REG. DEB. 34 (1824) (resolve
of Senator Barbour requesting that the President “state the additional means necessary and expedient to
be entrusted to the Executive for the suppression of [piracies]”).
263
Piracies on the Commerce of the United States in the West Indies, No. 381 (Dec. 13, 1824), in
5 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 262, at 428 (letter from “citizens of New York” to House of
Representatives); Piracies on the Commerce of the United States in the West Indies, No. 385 (Dec. 16,
1824), in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 262, at 471 (letter from merchants of Portland, Maine, to
House of Representatives).
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“blockade . . . the ports” of Cuba and Puerto Rico.264 Congress carefully
debated these measures. On the one hand, the situation for U.S. shipping
was dire and Spain could not be bothered to take responsibility for the
depredations committed from its own territory. On the other, placing U.S.
troops on Spanish soil, authorizing reprisals against Spanish merchants, and
blockading Spanish ports—though perhaps justified under the law of
nations—were steps towards war and they might not have had the intended
effect of ending piracy.265
Ultimately Congress authorized the President to enlarge the Navy but
declined to give him power to engage in warlike measures against Spain.266
Apparently the congressional debate alone was sufficient to send a message
to Spain. Before long, Spain sent soldiers to cooperate with the U.S. Navy
in an operation against one of the pirate strongholds on Puerto Rico.267
After a firefight, the Americans handed the captives over to the Spanish.
Within days the Spanish court-martialed, shot, and dismembered the
pirates, sending their remains to other ports around the island as a
warning.268 The Spanish approach to discouraging pirates proved extremely
effective. Piracy in the Caribbean dwindled.269
The episode invites reflection on what Congress believed to be the
right of punishment only upon a legal adjudication of fact when it declined
to authorize U.S. captains to punish pirates on the spot.270 Did Congress
consider authorizing Navy captains to court-martial pirates? At least in
theory, it could have done so. Perhaps the difference is that the United
States considered the pirates in Puerto Rico and Cuba to be criminals,
whereas the Spanish military considered them to be enemies who were
264

1 REG. DEB. 198–99 (1825) (Monroe to Senate); Message and Documents Relative to Piracies
Near the Spanish West India Islands, No. 391, in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 262, at 490.
265
See generally 1 REG. DEB. 714–35 (1825) (House considers bill on piracy); 1 REG. DEB. 375–79
(1825) (statement of Senator Mills); 1 REG. DEB. 303–18 (1825) (statements of Senator Tazewell;
statement of Senator Barbour); 1 REG. DEB. 275–84 (1825) (statement of Senator Barbour; statement of
Senator Smith).
266
Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 131 (authorizing the building of ten sloops of war); see also
Crimes Act of 1825, 4 Stat. 115–23; 1 REG. DEB. 154–56, 165–69, 348–55, 718 (1825).
267
See Capture of a Pirate, 19 SAILOR’S MAGAZINE AND NAVAL JOURNAL, August 1847, at 369,
369–70 (quoting a publication from Hunt’s Magazine of a portion of a biography of Commodore Sloat).
268
See id. (court-martial); Extract of a Letter From Lieut. Comdt. John D. Sloat, Commanding U.S.
Schr. Grampus, to the Secretary of the Navy Dated St. Thomas 5th April, 1825, NILES’ WEEKLY REG.,
April 30, 1825, at 142 (“[T]he captain general assured me that these miscreants should have the most
summary justice . . . [and] [t]hose already executed have been beheaded and quartered, and their parts
sent to all the small ports round the island to be exhibited.”).
269
ALLEN, supra note 230, at 86. The last recorded piracy in the Atlantic was from the Mexican,
which was captured on the high seas in the North Atlantic. Six of the crew were tried and executed in
Boston in 1835. Id. at 89.
270
See 1 NAVAL AFFAIRS supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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violating the laws of war. In any case, it is clear that the United States,
when it had opportunity and motive to do so, declined to reduce the
protections of due process for noncitizens engaged in depredations against
U.S. interests on the high seas and within foreign waters—even when other
maritime powers were supplying far less procedural protections for the
same conduct. The strong implication is that Congress believed it was
constrained by U.S. law, and the only U.S. law that could constrain
Congress was the Constitution. The Due Process Clause summarized all of
the constitutional constraints on Congress’s authority to reduce structural
and procedural protections for criminal suspects.
2.   The Monroe Cabinet’s Objections to Mixed Tribunals
Pirates were not the only criminals abroad protected by due process.
While the United States was fighting pirates in the Caribbean, it was also
negotiating a treaty with Britain to suppress the Atlantic slave trade. The
Monroe Cabinet ultimately declined to sign this treaty because it would
have subjected Americans suspected of engaging in the slave trade to trial
by a “mixed tribunal” composed of U.S. and British judges. This would
have violated the Constitution’s requirement that persons charged with
federal crimes be tried in a U.S. court.
Britain had already entered into a number of bilateral treaties
subjecting the ships of both nations to search and seizure by the other’s
officers and subjecting those ships to confiscation upon condemnation by
an ad hoc tribunal composed of judges appointed by both nations.271 For
Americans, the mutual-search provision was a sticking point; they still
smarted from British impressment of American sailors during the
Napoleonic Wars.272 But the Monroe Cabinet also objected to the mixed
tribunals on a variety of constitutional grounds.273
In an 1818 Cabinet meeting, Attorney General William Wirt argued
that the mixed courts would violate a number of constitutional
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See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law,
117 YALE L.J. 550, 552, 576–78 (2008).
272
See Martinez, supra note 61, at 1094 (“[V]iewing the full context of the negotiations between
the British and the Americans, it is clear that the United States’ main objection was to the right of
maritime search that the treaties conferred on the British government.”).
273
Scholars have debated the implications of these objections for the constitutionality of the United
States’ contemporary involvement with the International Criminal Court (ICC), but they have not
explored the implication of the evidence for the original reach of due process abroad. See Eugene
Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade
Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 75–81 (2009) (arguing that submitting to the ICC is unconstitutional);
Martinez, supra note 61, at 1125 (arguing that the Monroe Administration arguments do not foreclose
the constitutionality of submitting to the ICC).
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protections.274 But Secretary of State John Quincy Adams pointed out that
the United States already relied on mixed tribunals in some cases. Wirt
“distinguished the two” by saying that the existing tribunals enforced “the
law of nations,” whereas the proposed courts would “carry into effect our
municipal and penal statutes.”275 At the time, the slave trade was not a
violation of the law of nations. Attorney General Wirt’s position seems to
have won the day. In 1819, the Cabinet instructed the U.S. negotiator,
Richard Rush, to reject the mixed tribunals on the ground that the United
States had no territory abroad that would be convenient for them to hold
their sessions and on the ground that the judges would not be amenable to
impeachment.276
At first Secretary Adams believed that there was no constitutional
difficulty with the tribunals.277 As the negotiations progressed, he either
changed his view or decided to go along with the other members of the
Cabinet. By the fall of 1820, he appears to have been in full agreement with
them. In a conversation with Stratford Canning, the British diplomat,
Adams argued that the Fifth Amendment “amounts to an express
prohibition to subjecting any citizen of the United States to trial before
such a tribunal.”278 Two months later, in a letter to Canning, he expressed
concern that under the proposal Americans would be “called to answer for
any penal offence without the intervention of a grand jury to accuse, and of
a jury of trial to decide upon the charge.”279 He reiterated the same concern
in a letter to Canning in 1821.280 Likewise, Albert Gallatin, then Minister to
274

Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 30, 1818), in 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
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Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Apr. 14, 1819), in 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
supra note 274, at 333, 335.
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Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 30, 1818), in 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
supra note 274, at 148, 151.
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Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Oct. 26, 1820), in 5 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
supra note 274, at 191, 191–92.
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Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (Dec. 30, 1820), in 7 WRITINGS OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS 84, 86 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1917). Adams’ concerns about the grand jury
and trial jury clauses of the Fifth Amendment suggest that he believed that the tribunals would exercise
criminal jurisdiction. Britain’s other bilateral treaties on the topic contemplated only civil enforcement.
It is possible that Adams was confused about the British proposal. More likely, Britain had suggested
giving the tribunals authority to enforce the two nations’ respective criminal laws against the slave
trade.
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Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (Aug. 15, 1821), in 7 WRITINGS OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 279, at 171, 174 (objecting to “subjecting [American citizens] to trial for
offences against their municipal statutes, before foreign judges in countries beyond the seas”); see also
Letter from John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush (June 24, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS, supra note 279, at 489, 495 (emphasizing that “there is no uniformity in the modes of trial to
which piracy by the law of nations is subjected in different European countries” and that if the “slave-
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France, wrote to Adams that “we never would agree that the property and,
above all, the persons of our citizens should, for any presumed violation of
our own laws, be tried by a foreign or mixed tribunal.”281 Adams, Gallatin,
and Wirt all made arguments articulating the importance of due process
abroad for citizens accused of violating U.S. law.282
The two nations’ diplomats agreed in 1824 to a treaty that provided
for condemnation proceedings in the owner’s domestic courts—not before
a mixed tribunal.283 This assuaged the Cabinet members’ constitutional
concerns about the mixed tribunals.284 It also probably reduced the concern
about arbitrary British seizures—British captains seizing U.S. vessels could
be held liable in U.S. federal courts for overstepping their authority.285 To
the extent, therefore, that the Americans sought to gain some domestic
oversight of British captains, the plan had worked.286
Notwithstanding the Executive’s commitment to due process for
criminal suspects captured on the high seas, there is evidence that in some
cases U.S. captains destroyed pirate vessels and cargoes on the spot rather
than taking them in for condemnation.287 To some extent, then, Americans
treated persons captured on the high seas differently than property. This
may have been for sheer expediency. It would have been easier, less
expensive, and less troublesome to a long-term mission to detain a suspect

trade should be recognized as piracy under the law of nations,” though the ships would be “seizable by
the officers and authorities of every nation, they should be triable only by the tribunals of the country of
the slave-trading vessel” to “guard the innocent navigator against vexatious detentions, and all the evils
of arbitrary search”).
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GALLATIN 229, 230 (Henry Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879).
282
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Americans appear to have understood due process abroad, the arguments are eminently plausible. In
general, a legal argument’s usefulness tends to correlate directly with its plausibility.
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See Suppression of the Slave Trade, No. 374 (May 21, 1824), in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 262, at 344, 344–46 (Monroe to Senate).
284
Id. at 345.
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Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (June 24, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 279, at 498, 502 (“The objections to the right of search, as incident to the
right of detention and capture, are also in a very considerable degree removed by the introduction of the
principle that neither of them should be exercised, but under the responsibility of the captor, to the
tribunals of the captured party in damages and costs. This guard against the abuses of a power so liable
to abuse would be indispensable.”).
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But apparently it had not worked enough: the Senate rejected the treaty. It was not until 1862,
after the slave trade had become a crime under the law of nations, that the United States and Britain
finally agreed to cooperate to put an end to the trade. Martinez, supra note 61 at 1086.
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See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 230, at 85 (“The prize schooners were brought away but afterwards
went ashore in a squall and were set on fire.”).
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aboard the captor’s vessel than to put a prize crew aboard a suspected pirate
vessel and sail it to the United States for condemnation proceedings. The
benefit of doing so would have been especially low when the captured
vessel and cargo had little value. Nevertheless, destroying the vessel and
cargo without condemnation would have deprived someone (whether the
pirate or his victims) of property rights (however meager) without due
process of law. The fact that these property rights were valued and honored
under the law of nations is illustrated by the rule that a court that
condemned pirate property was obligated to hold it notoriously for a year
before selling it on the open market, so the original owner would have a
chance to claim it.288 During the Colonial Era, the lords of admiralty knew
this rule and generally complied with it, but simultaneously instructed their
warships “to use their best endeavours to take, sink, and burn, or otherwise
destroy such pirates as may infest [colonial waters].”289 By contrast, the
Piracy Act of 1819, enacted during the height of the U.S. “war on
Caribbean piracy,” authorized the President to instruct naval commanders
“to subdue, take, and send into any port of the United States, any armed
vessel or boat” when the crew “shall have attempted or committed any
piratical aggression.”290 That same statute provided that condemnation of
pirate ships would be by “due process and trial.”291 To the extent American
vessels departed from such instructions, they acted unlawfully, though
perhaps in some cases they could claim necessity.
3.   Distinguishing War
Some scholars have looked at the early conduct of the U.S. military
abroad and concluded that due process did not apply extraterritorially.292
They rely heavily on evidence of the military’s exercise of war power
rather than ordinary law enforcement. It is easy to confuse the evidence.
The most thorough scholarly book on the Constitution during war in the
early Republic treats the Navy’s actions against the pirates of Cuba and
Puerto Rico alongside the nation’s other military ventures.293 And as
discussed above, many federal criminal and civil statutes authorized the
President to enforce them with public warships.294 But Americans
288
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consistently distinguished between the constitutional limitations on the
Navy’s law enforcement powers abroad and the government’s
constitutional authority to make war. This Section discusses three episodes
where the government did not supply ordinary due process. On the surface,
the episodes may seem factually indistinguishable from others where the
government did supply due process. On closer scrutiny, however, it is clear
that the government considered the departures from due process to be
justified by its exercise of war power.
a.   An Exercise in Line Drawing: Attorney General Lee, 1798
During the naval war with France, Attorney General Charles Lee sent
an illuminating memo. In 1798, the U.S.S. Constitution brought the Nigre
into Norfolk as a prize.295 The ship’s officers and crew included Americans
and foreigners. Lee carefully instructed Thomas Nelson, District Attorney
for Virginia, to engage in a “due inquiry”296 to determine whether “the ship
is regularly commissioned and authorized by France as a public or private
ship of war.”297 Lee instructed Nelson that if France had commissioned the
vessel, he was to hold the foreigners as prisoners of war and prosecute the
Americans for treason or for piracy under the Crimes Act of 1790.298 If the
ship was operating without sovereign authority, however, Nelson was to
prosecute them all for piracy in the circuit court “according to the law of
the United States, without respect to the nation which each individual may
belong, whether he be British, French, American, or of any other nation.”299
Lee took special care to instruct Nelson that the trial should proceed
according to federal rules, not according to Virginia practice, which “is a
species of trial that gives a chance of acquittal unknown in other states.”300
Lee reminded Nelson that, while the circuit court was the proper venue for
trying crimes on the high seas, “proceedings” “against the ship and cargo”
“are to be had before the district court of the United States in Virginia,
according to the laws of Congress and the usage and practice of courts of
admiralty in prize causes.”301 Like any responsible prosecutor, Lee intended
to give the defendant whatever process was due by law—in this case, the
Judiciary Act of 1789—not necessarily the process most favorable to the
defendant. Lee understood that the process due to defendants before the
government could deprive them of property for conduct on the high seas
295
296
297
298
299
300
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differed from the process due before the government could deprive them of
liberty. Altogether the instructions show that Lee knew that the detainees’
rights of liberty and property, and the process due before the government
could deprive them of those rights, depended on whether their conduct
amounted to war or crime.
b.   Countering Quasi-Sovereign Groups:
Amelia Island, 1816–17
In 1817, the United States took possession of Amelia Island, just
southeast of Georgia, and dispersed a band of brigands who had taken it
from the Spanish.302 From the United States’ standpoint, the enterprise
amounted to an exercise of war power because it entailed military action
against a group with political pretensions that had taken territory adjacent
to the United States by force.
Formally the island belonged to Spain. Several groups claiming
authority from Mexico and New Granada—two rebellious Spanish
colonies—had successively taken the island from Spanish troops.303 They
used it as a base for privateering and smuggling.304 The leader at the time
was Louis de Aury, a Frenchman who modestly claimed the title of
“Captain-General of the Navy of the Independent States of Mexico and
New Granada, Political and Military Chief of the Island of Amelia, and
General-in-chief of the sea and Land Forces destined to expel the
Authorities of the King of Spain from the Provinces of Florida.”305
President Monroe was concerned about the group’s privateering and
smuggling into the United States.306 He ordered the Navy to take the
island—without bloodshed if possible.307 The exercise held little risk for
U.S. diplomacy. The United States did not think that Aury held a
commission and had reason to believe that Spain would be glad to be rid of
the freebooters.308
Although Aury and his band may not have been technically “enemies”
under the law of nations, the U.S. capture of the island proceeded like an
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act of war. The U.S. officers addressed “General Aury” as the
“Commander-in-chief” and ordered “the forces under [his] command” to
evacuate the island with “such property as unquestionably belongs to them”
and to leave behind any public property.309 Aury and his men surrendered
without a fight but questioned how the U.S. forces could constitutionally
determine the occupants’ property rights without trial by a tribunal with
jurisdiction over Amelia Island.310 Potential disputes over the movable
property on the island did not seem to disturb the U.S. officers. They were
probably just glad to have the men leave with what little they could carry.
And leave they did. Despite having been motivated by concerns about law
enforcement, the United States did not institute prosecutions or “punish”
any of the men for criminal conduct, and the recapture of the island was,
strictly speaking, without due process of law.311
After the fact, Congress considered whether the capture had been
lawful. A House Select Committee offered two justifications. The first was
Section 7 of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, which authorized the President to
use naval forces to curb smuggling.312 The Act was a municipal criminal
law, and if it had been the sole basis of the Executive’s authority to capture
Amelia Island, the incident suggests that law enforcement abroad was not
subject to due process of law. The Select Committee offered an additional
justification, however, that applied specifically to the capture of Amelia
Island and that fits better with the other evidence of early law enforcement
abroad. In 1811, the House and Senate had jointly resolved to authorize the
President to use the military to take possession of Amelia Island “in the
event of an attempt to occupy the said territory, or any part thereof, by any
foreign Government or Power.”313 Congress had thus given the President
conditional authority to exercise the nation’s war power—by taking
possession of the island—upon a specific condition precedent. The
President expressly relied on this congressional resolution to justify the
capture of Amelia Island to Spain.314
The only question was whether Aury’s occupation of the island
satisfied the condition laid out by the resolution. Some scholars have
suggested that the claim that Aury and his men amounted to a “foreign . . .
309
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Power” “within the intendment of Congress” “is difficult to suppose.”315
While the bandits certainly presented themselves as being aligned with a
foreign power, the United States did not recognize the validity of their
commissions from Mexico (and indeed was reluctant to recognize the
sovereignty of Mexico itself).316 However, the United States could still have
plausibly believed that the group was a “foreign . . . Power.” The
resolution’s breadth suggests that Congress had intended to include
political groups that did not amount to a “Government.” In any case, the
evidence strongly suggests that Congress and the President understood the
capture of Amelia Island to be an exercise of war power. As such, it was
subject to the law of war, not to ordinary due process of law.
c.   Attacking Enemies: Pensacola, 1817–19
Between 1817 and 1819, General Andrew Jackson defeated the
Seminoles in Florida and captured Pensacola and Ft. St. Marks from the
Spanish.317 Along the way, he captured two British agents suspected of
fomenting the Seminoles against the Americans, tried them by courtmartial, and, upon conviction, ordered them executed.318 At the time,
Jackson defended his actions by arguing that the British agents had
engaged in piracy and therefore did not deserve due process of law. “It is
an established principle of the law of nations, that any individual of a
nation, making war against the citizens of another nation, they being at
peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a pirate.”319 With
this assertion, Jackson showed how little he knew about the law of nations,
piracy, and due process; the entire statement was a jumble of mistakes.
The House of Representatives debated the lawfulness of Jackson’s
conduct in the context of considering a motion to censure him. His political
star was on the rise, ensuring that the debates would be shaped by partisan
interests. Nevertheless, the two official reports out of Congress both
insisted that the conduct was lawful, if at all, because it was justified under
the law of war. The House Committee on Military Affairs could “find no
315
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law of the United States, authorizing a trial, before a military court, for
such offences as are alleged against” them with the exception of the charge
of espionage, of which they were acquitted.320 Neither did “any ‘usage
authorize,’ or exigency appear from the documents accompanying the
report of the trial” that would “justify the assumption and exercise of power
by the court martial, and the commanding General.”321 In other words,
Congress believed that neither U.S. law nor the laws of war authorized the
proceedings. In response to Jackson’s assertion that the agents had been
guilty of “piracy,” the Committee asked “by what system of interpretation
the offences charged could be considered as piracies, which imply, in
common acceptation, offences upon the high seas, of which the court could
not assume cognizance.”322 Of course the only courts that could exercise
jurisdiction over piracy were the federal courts. The Committee
“disapprove[d] the proceedings.”323
The Committee also produced a minority report.324 The minority report
did not even try to justify the court-martial as a proper court for the trial of
piracy. Rather, the report argued that Jackson’s whole expedition into
Florida was justified under the law of nations and that the trial and
executions were justified as exemplary retaliation against those who, aiding
and abetting “the savages,” “excit[ed] them to the war” against the United
States.325
Ultimately the House declined to formally censure Jackson. Although
Congress had not authorized the venture, a majority of the House
apparently concluded that the President had the constitutional authority to
do so on the ground that the expedition was a defensive maneuver.326
However, the debate among the members of the House Committee on
Military Affairs about the legality of the court-martial is telling.
Punishment for piracy could only follow conviction in a court with
jurisdiction over the crime. Therefore, any constitutional authority the
President may have to try and execute prisoners must arise from a lawful
exercise of war powers.327
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C.   Suits Against U.S. Officers
The right of those captured unlawfully abroad to sue the captor in
federal court reinforces the notion that due process extended wherever the
United States exercised federal law enforcement power. Scholars have long
recognized that those subject to unlawful searches, seizures, and other
interferences with private rights could sue the officer or government agent
in state court for common law trespass.328 The defendant official could
attempt to justify the trespass by pointing to lawful authority. Without it, he
would be liable for damages. These damages were understood to enforce
constitutional norms.
As we have seen above, those harmed by unlawful official conduct on
the high seas and in foreign territory were likewise entitled to sue the
officer in federal court for damages arising from maritime trespass.329
Under the law of nations, seizures on the high seas were subject to the
authority of the captor’s sovereign.330 The sovereign’s agent could seize a
vessel only upon reasonable suspicion that the vessel was within that
authority.331 Without reasonable suspicion, the capture was unlawful and
the owner was entitled to restitution in the captor’s courts.332 Without
probable cause for the capture, the captor could be held liable for
damages.333
The United States Constitution authorized Congress to define crimes
on the high seas and make rules governing captures.334 Captains of U.S.
warships seeking to enforce a criminal or civil municipal law on the high
seas, therefore, could only seize vessels upon reasonable suspicion of a
violation of that law. Courts enforced these laws, which arose under the
328
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law of nations, by awarding damages to those whose ships were seized
without lawful authority.335 The subject matter of the U.S. law the officer
had been attempting to enforce apparently was irrelevant—courts evaluated
the lawfulness of seizures made to enforce non-intercourse acts,336
embargoes,337 criminal laws,338 and war.339 Complying with an executive
order that exceeded congressional authorization was no defense—the
authority had to come from Congress.340
To my knowledge, Americans did not conceive of a maritime trespass
suit against a U.S. officer as a mechanism to enforce the Bill of Rights in
the way that Americans may have understood a common law trespass suit
against a federal officer to enforce the Fourth Amendment.341 But the suits
illustrate that federal courts enforced separation of powers limits on the
Executive’s authority to enforce U.S. law against anyone, anywhere. As the
Supreme Court later noted, due process entails “[t]he enforcement of these
[constitutional] limitations by judicial process.”342 Functionally, suits
against officers ensured due process of law for anyone threatened by
unlawful deprivations, regardless of where the deprivation occurred.
D.   Addressing Alternative Explanations
Much of the foregoing historical evidence is indirect. It consists of
practice, rather than affirmative assertions about what the Due Process
Clause requires. Some of the evidence is ambiguous⎯Did Congress
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decline to authorize the President to destroy pirates upon capture because it
believed the Fifth Amendment prohibited such a deprivation of life or for
some other reason? Here I consider several other possible explanations for
the evidence. It is important to note, however, that these explanations are
not mutually exclusive. Rather, many are mutually reinforcing. Sometimes
diplomatic strategy coincides with constitutional obligation, and so on.
The first possibility to consider is that Americans provided due
process because they believed the law of nations required them to do so.
For civil admiralty suits, that is almost certainly the case. Admiralty law
and procedures were well-known and applied by admiralty courts in all the
maritime powers.343 But each of those powers also had their own municipal
constitutional structures that affected the relationship of those courts to the
rest of the government, and they also had their own municipal laws
governing conduct on the sea.344 While a prize respondent could expect
courts in England, France, and the United States to use nearly identical
procedures, the respondent could not expect the courts to take the same
approach to the nation’s substantive law, because that law would be
governed by domestic constitutional principles.345 In any case, at the highest
level of abstraction, the law of nations and due process of law are probably
best understood as reinforcing the required procedural protections in civil
admiralty cases.
Criminal admiralty cases were different. The law of nations may have
held that pirates were entitled to a trial of some kind.346 But the law of
nations said nothing about the nature of that trial.347 Every nation proceeded
according to its own municipal law. The United States, alone, uniformly
tried offenses on the high seas (and foreign waters) according to the same
structural and procedural protections that applied to all other criminals.348
As we have seen, Britain had a dual system.349 A long list of offenses on the
high seas were tried in England by Admiralty Session according to the
course of the common law. Throughout the eighteenth century, however,
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England tried piracy, robbery, and felonies committed on the high seas
before special commissions in the colonies according to the civil law.350
Interestingly, in 1806, some fifteen years after the first criminal law
statute in the United States expressly provided that pirates would be tried
according to due process of law, Britain reversed course again. A Mr.
Jervis introduced a bill in the House of Commons “for altering and
expediting the trial of offences committed in distant parts on the high
seas.”351 The dual system, he claimed, had two problems. The Act of 1699
covered only a subset of the offenses covered by the Act of 1536; the
commissions in the colonies could only try a handful of crimes on the high
seas, many of which went unpunished because it was so difficult to
transport the accused to Britain for trial.352 The second problem was that the
commissions in the colonies “acted upon the principles of the civil law,
which were very different from those of the common law of this
country. . . . The design of [Jervis’s] bill, therefore, was to prevent the
necessity for bringing home the offenders, and also that they might enjoy
the benefit of the trial by jury, and not be tried according to the forms of the
civil law.”353 Parliament enacted the bill in essentially the same form,
extending “one uniform course of trial” for all offenses at sea to
commissions sitting in the colonies.354 They would “adjudge according to
the common course of the laws of this realm used for offences committed
upon the land within this realm, and not otherwise.”355
This 1806 bill underscores two points about the foregoing account of
due process. First, the trial procedures for crimes committed on the high
seas were a matter of municipal law, not the law of nations. For more than
a century, Britain had two different procedural regimes. Neither were
understood to be required by, or to offend, the law of nations. When Britain
unified the regime, it did not do so because of the law of nations. Second,
Britain itself came to acknowledge that its own constitutional tradition
counseled trying offenses at sea by the common law. Well after the
American Revolution, and after the United States had committed itself to
trying all crimes by jury, Britain extended “the benefit of the trial by
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jury”356 and the “common course of the laws of [the] realm” to all offenses
at sea, wherever the trial would be held.357
Britain was not alone in trying pirates in special courts. Throughout
this period, French law provided for the trial of pirates in special admiralty
courts, outside of the ordinary criminal courts.358 As we have seen, Spain
sometimes tried pirates by court-martial.359 Nothing in the law of nations
itself, or in the practice of other nations, suggests that a nation was
obligated to try offenses at sea or outside of its sovereign territory in the
same courts and according to the same procedures that it used to try other
offenses.
The second possibility is that the United States provided due process
for the trial of conduct abroad for reasons of diplomacy. The foregoing
evidence about other nations’ municipal law and practice regarding the trial
of extraterritorial conduct undermines this argument. While every nation
was expected to supply admiralty courts for the trial of prize cases and civil
maritime suits,360 there is no evidence that the United States relied on
ordinary federal courts to punish offenses at sea because of diplomatic
pressure. And since other nations did things differently, they would have
had no reason to push the United States to provide more rather than less
procedural protections for pirates.
Another possibility is that the Executive and Judicial Departments
provided due process simply because Congress required it in the relevant
statutes. Congress, according to this view, lawfully could have provided for
a different procedural regime for offenses at sea had it wanted to do so.
This seems unlikely, for several reasons. All of the officials who expressly
considered the application of the Fifth Amendment to the punishment of
crimes committed abroad concluded that the provision required conviction
in a federal court.361 Moreover, Congress had the incentive and the
356

6 Parl. Deb. HC (1st ser.) (1806) col. cc723–24.
The Offences at Sea Act 1806, 46 Geo. 3 c. 54.
358
In 1681, a marine ordinance gave jurisdiction over piracies and other offenses on the sea to the
Judges of the Admiralty. Marine Ordinance of August 1681, bk. 1, tit. 2, art. X; see Piracy Laws, AM. J.
INT’L L. SUP. 963 (1932) (summary in English). In an act of 1825, France provided that pirates would
generally be tried by maritime courts. See Law for the Safety of Navigation and Maritime Commerce,
April 10, 1825, tit. III, art. 17; AM. J. INT’L SUP. 966 (English translation). There were exceptions for
some French citizens, however. A French citizen who accepted a privateering commission from a
foreign power without the French king’s authority would be “tried in accordance with the procedure of
and by the ordinary courts.” See id. Furthermore, certain French citizens accused of being an
accomplice would be “tried by the ordinary courts.” Act of 1825, tit. III, art. 19; see AM. J. INT’L L.
SUP. 967 (English translation).
359
See supra Section V.B.1.
360
See supra Section II.A.
361
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
357

436

112:377 (2017)

Due Process Abroad

opportunity to abrogate due process of law for offenses at sea during the
early 1820s when it equipped the Navy to suppress piracy in the West
Indies.362 It declined to do so, concluding instead that it was “essentially
due to the rights of all” to try pirates in ordinary federal courts according to
the common law363—at the same time that Spanish colonial forces were
trying and executing pirates by courts-martial.
Finally, perhaps Congress was constrained by the separation of
powers provisions of the Constitution, not by the Fifth Amendment. After
all, Article III provides that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury.364 It vests
the admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts.365 In light of these
provisions, perhaps the Due Process Clause was redundant. In some ways,
this is true. The Due Process Clause forbade the government from
depriving rights except according to law. The Constitution was the law.
Had Congress enacted a law that purported to vest the power to adjudicate
piracy in a non-Article III court, or to authorize a court to try piracy
without a jury trial, the law would have been subject to the charge that it
violated Article III.366 When the Executive, or the statutory tribunal,
attempted to deprive a defendant of life, liberty, or property according to
that law, the deprivation would have violated the Due Process Clause.
What the Clause added was the right to enforce the law, including the
Constitution, in federal court. This would have included not only suits for
damages but also the right to make motions and raise objections to any
unlawful procedure by which the government attempted to deprive a party
of life, liberty, or property. The totality of the historical evidence strongly
suggests that Americans believed that the Due Process Clause, along with
the separation of powers, applied to governmental deprivations of rights—
anywhere, and against anyone.
VI.  DUE PROCESS ABROAD TODAY
This Part considers the implications of the foregoing history for the
scope of due process abroad today. It briefly notes the challenges of doing
so; argues that the history strongly supports extending due process to U.S.
law enforcement against anyone, anywhere in the world; and discusses the
specific implications of the history for suits arising from cross-border
shootings, officially-sponsored kidnappings and detentions, governmental
deprivations of statutory immigration benefits, and criminal procedure.
362
363
364
365
366

See supra Section V.B.1.
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Id.
See id.
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A.   Of Water and Bridges
While most jurists and scholars agree that the early history matters for
contemporary constitutional interpretation and application,367 everyone has
their own view about which historical evidence is most salient, how much
weight it should have, and when it should yield to subsequent
developments in law, society, and political morality. Even self-proclaimed
originalists have splintered like medieval scholastics into competing
methodological schools.368 If “we are all originalists now,”369 then perhaps
no one is.
Moreover, translating the early history of constitutional
extraterritoriality into contemporary doctrine presents unique challenges.
The United States seems to have abandoned a strict adherence to due
process abroad shortly after the period this Article explores. In 1828, the
Supreme Court held that Congress had constitutional authority to create
territorial courts that did not comply with the requirements of Article III.370
During the nation’s rapid expansion in the nineteenth century, the federal
government systematically declined to extend equal rights as a matter of
constitutional law (as opposed to congressional policy) to Indians,
immigrants, and residents of new territories.371 The Court maintained that
the federal government possessed powers inherent in sovereignty—powers
the Constitution neither expressly gave nor expressly limited.372 While these
developments each have their own history and require their own legal
analysis, it may not be too much to generalize that Americans, faced with
the challenges and prospects of a far-flung and culturally pluralistic empire,
to some extent embraced the reasoning of the imperial British constitution

367

See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1984) (identifying history as one of the types of
constitutional argument).
368
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599,
599 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series,
No.
07-24,
2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244
[https://perma.cc/7NEA-5D24].
369
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 1–77 (2011);
Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, Do Kagan, Roberts Actually Agree?, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2010),
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/08/do-kagan-roberts-actually-agree-040600
[perma.cc/P84X7UR] (quoting Justice Elena Kagan in her confirmation hearing).
370
Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
371
See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
See also RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
372
See Cleveland, supra note 371.
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that they had once repudiated. By doing so, they quietly abandoned an
early commitment to due process abroad.
In addition, much of the historical evidence on which this Article’s
argument relies is of an unusual sort: inference from early practice.
Although some expressly considered the issue and concluded that due
process applies abroad, most Americans simply supplied it routinely, even
when doing so undermined the government’s policy goals and even when
competing nations did not. This form of evidence raises intriguing
questions for originalists⎯How much should early practice bear on an
analysis of the “original understanding” of the constitutional text? Should
unarticulated but clearly consistent early practices bind contemporary
constitutional decisionmakers?
For my part, I am persuaded that early Americans understood that due
process applied to law enforcement activities abroad, even when they did
not articulate it as contemporary jurists would. The historical background,
constitutional text, the testimony of some of the brightest legal lights of the
founding generation, and the uniform early practice of U.S. officers all
support this conclusion. Whether there is too much water under the bridge
to return to the original understanding is another question, and, like all
legal questions, a matter of judgment.
B.   Contemporary Implications
1.   General Principles
The early history supports extending due process to the enforcement
of U.S. law against anyone, anywhere. As a general matter, this means that
the government may not in the course of enforcing U.S. law deprive
anyone of “life, liberty, or property” without complying with applicable
substantive, structural, and procedural law. It also means that the
procedures by which the United States deprives someone of rights must
meet a minimum constitutional threshold of notice and opportunity to
respond.
Although the United States usually provides the full panoply of due
process protections in litigation based on foreign conduct, the Supreme
Court has never squarely held that the Due Process Clause requires this.
The last time the Court considered the issue, in Reid v. Covert, the Justices
could not reach a majority opinion about whether the Clause applies
universally, applies conditionally depending on functional concerns, or
categorically does not apply to trials arising from conduct abroad.373 The
majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush holds that the Suspension Clause
373

354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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applies to the detention of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.374 But it
remains unclear whether the Court’s ad hoc and fact-dependent reasoning
applies to the Due Process Clause or to detentions by U.S. officers on
territory that the United States has not leased from another sovereign for an
indefinite term.375 By contrast, the early enforcement of piracy and other
crimes on the high seas suggests that Americans understood due process to
keep pace with Congress’s power to define and punish crimes and civil
wrongs abroad.
Some may object that most of the evidence above pertains to law
enforcement on the high seas, not on foreign soil. Several early statutes
criminalized conduct in foreign territory,376 but I am unaware of any
indictments based on such conduct. As discussed above, the doctrine of
territorial sovereignty held that a nation could only extend its criminal
legislation to another state’s territory with that state’s consent.377 Perhaps,
then, the evidence above does no more than show that due process
extended to the high seas; maybe citizens and aliens on foreign soil are
different. The U.S. now extends its criminal statutes, by treaty, to a wide
range of conduct committed on foreign territory.378 Perhaps, the argument
might go, the federal government may avoid the limits of due process of
law by acting on foreign territory pursuant to a statute enacted to comply
with a treaty. This argument, however, has two flaws.
First, treaties are almost certainly subject to constitutional limits. The
Supreme Court has held that a treaty may authorize Congress to enact a
statute that it would otherwise lack the constitutional power to enact,379 but
it does not follow that the Constitution’s limitations, such as ex post facto
and due process provisions, do not apply to statutes enacted to enforce a
treaty.380 Whatever legislative power a treaty may add to Congress, it
374

553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See Van Houten, supra note 3.
376
See Slave Trade Act of 1818, ch. 91, § 4, 3 Stat. 450, 451 (punishing any “citizen or [resident]
of the United States” who “shall . . . take on board, receive, or transport, from any of the coasts or
kingdoms of Africa, or from any other foreign kingdom, place, or country, or from [the] sea” in any
vessel any person for the purpose of enslaving them).
377
See supra Section I.A.
378
See generally CHARLES DOYLE, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
LAW 40–63 (2012) (collecting statutes). See also TONYA L. PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS 4
(2016) (arguing that U.S. courts are most likely to apply U.S. law abroad when “extraterritorial conduct
poses a threat to the functioning of U.S. law inside U.S. territory” and “when U.S. citizens and others
with close U.S. ties are accused of violating a short list of rights at the core of American political
identity”).
379
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920).
380
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion) (“It would be
manifestly contrary to the objective of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were
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derives from the government’s constitutional authority to make treaties and
enact legislation. These laws are subject to the Constitution’s express
limits.
More basically, allowing Congress to skirt constitutional limits by
treaty is inconsistent with the notion that the government derives its
authority from the American people. Why would those people have
authorized their government to avoid constitutional limits—but only when
the government teams up with a foreign sovereign? As Justice Hugo Black
noted, “[i]n effect, such construction [of the Constitution] would permit
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V.”381
2.   Translating Early Due Process Into Contemporary Due Process
Before turning to the more specific applications of due process
abroad, it will be helpful to distinguish among the varieties of
contemporary due process doctrines. Courts rely on due process for
jurisdictional limits—the authority of a sovereign to exercise power over a
certain person. They likewise recognize limits on the procedures by which
the government deprives someone of rights, usually called “procedural due
process.” Finally, “substantive due process” holds that there are certain
fundamental rights with which the government may not interfere no matter
how much process it provides. Of these three categories, the historical
understanding of due process explored in this Article most closely
resembles today’s “procedural due process.” The original understanding,
however, is different from the balancing test of contemporary procedural
due process. The original understanding of due process guaranteed that
courts would enforce constitutional and statutory limits on governmental
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.”
There are currently a number of unanswered questions about the
application of due process to the nation’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.382 The
responsible for the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition—to
construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement
without observing constitutional prohibitions.”); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
381
Reid, 354 U.S. at 17.
382
See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (explaining that the Supreme Court has not addressed
whether the Fifth Amendment limits extraterritorial application of substantive federal law); Anthony J.
Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1310–11 (2014)
(distinguishing between prescriptive jurisdiction (power to prohibit) and adjudicative jurisdiction
(power to adjudicate)); Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV.
507, 531–45 (2016) (arguing that the only fairness limit on U.S. extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
should be whether the nation in which the defendant committed the conduct would punish it to the same
degrees as U.S. law); Brian M. Kelly, Due Process, Choice of Law, and the Prosecution of Foreign
Nationals for Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations in Conflicts Abroad (Harvard Law
School Addison Brown Student Writing Prize, May 2015), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
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evidence presented in this article does not directly address these issues. For
the most part, it appears that early congresses conscientiously crafted
extraterritorial statutes to regulate only the conduct of U.S. citizens,
conduct that otherwise directly affected the interest of U.S. citizens, or
conduct that could plausibly be understood to amount to a violation of a
universal norm under the law of nations. Whether Congress placed these
tacit limits on extraterritorial criminal statutes out of a concern for the law
of nations, the Constitution, international comity, or a combination of them
is beyond this Article’s scope.383 Although the early Supreme Court held
that Congress must clearly state its intent to depart from the law of
nations,384 I am aware of no cases in which the Court declined to enforce a
federal law because Congress lacked the power to reach the particular
extraterritorial conduct. Nor am I aware of a case in which the Court
declined to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction on the ground that the
defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the United States.
The evidence above likewise does not support the notion that early
courts enforced what jurists call “substantive due process.” There is simply
no evidence from early U.S. extraterritorial law enforcement that the
founding generation believed the federal government’s authority to make
general and prospective laws was limited by fundamental rights, whether
sounding in the right to contract385 or the right of physical privacy.386
The evidence does, however, support the application of something
more akin to contemporary procedural due process to the government’s law
enforcement abroad. The government was obligated to comply with the
separation of powers, the Executive was obligated to comply with
congressional authority, and the courts were obligated to comply with
appropriate procedures before a suspect or defendant could be deprived of
rights. This understanding was reflected in the laws themselves, the
instructions and conduct of executive officers, and judicial enforcement.
3.   Applying Due Process Abroad
This section discusses the implications of this broad principle for
specific cases. At the outset, it must be noted that constitutional law
distinguishes between rights and remedies. Although the Supreme Court
3:HUL.InstRepos:16645037 [https://perma.cc/49DZ-E78L] (analyzing a circuit split among federal
courts over the standard for determining personal jurisdiction of criminal defendants). See generally
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3,
2017) (presenting the basic rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
383
See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 137.
384
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
385
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
386
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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long ago observed that a right implies a remedy,387 the Court has exercised
great discretion over when and under what circumstances a judicial remedy
will be available for an acknowledged constitutional violation.388 For
instance, during much of the nineteenth century, a party could sue an
officer for an unreasonable and unwarranted search and seizure;389 by
contrast, the primary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation today is
exclusion of evidence procured by the violation.390 Each implication of the
historical evidence for a given case must therefore be attuned to this
distinction between the scope of a due process right and the appropriate
remedy for a violation of that right. The following Sections will therefore
discuss both rights and remedies.
a.   Cross-border shootings
The historical evidence supports applying the Due Process Clause to
cross-border shootings. In Hernández v. Mesa, a Border Patrol agent in
Texas shot and killed a Mexican teenager on the other side of the border.391
The victim’s parents sued the officer for violating the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to the shooting because the victim lacked
sufficient contacts with the United States.392 The judges could not agree
about whether the Due Process Clause applied to the shooting, but they
unanimously concluded that, even if it did apply, the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity because there was no prior case law on point.393
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court remanded the case with
instructions to consider whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action for
damages against the officer consistent with the Court’s doctrine about
when such actions are available.394 With respect to the plaintiffs’ due

387

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311 (1993) (“[T]here is no right to an individually
effective remedy for every constitutional violation.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) (“[T]here will always be some shortfall between the
aspirations we call rights and the mechanisms we call remedies.”).
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See Carlos M. Vásquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the
Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 531 (2013) (discussing the mechanics and limitations of
constitutional torts before Bivens).
390
See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1912 (2014)
(arguing that the exclusionary rule might be best understood as a requirement of due process).
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137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
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Hernández v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
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Id. at 120.
394
137 S. Ct. at 2006–07. The Court’s jurisprudence about when someone may sue a federal officer
for damages springs from Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In
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process claim, the Court tweaked the lower court’s analysis. The lower
court had based its decision that the officer was entitled to qualified
immunity on the due process claim in part because the victim was an alien
and had few contacts with the United States.395 But the officer did not know
those facts when he pulled the trigger.396 So they should not count, the
Supreme Court said, when determining whether the officer could have
reasonably known whether his conduct was unlawful.397 This direction,
though it could expose the officer to suit in this case, implies that the
Supreme Court believes that the victim’s nationality and location are
salient for at least some due process claims (when the officer knows the
victim is an alien, or is outside the United States, or both). This is
unfortunate. The historical evidence discussed in this article strongly
supports the application of the Due Process Clause to a law enforcement
official’s extraterritorial “depriv[ation]” of an alien’s “life” “without due
process of law.”
One difficulty of analyzing the constitutionality of a cross-border
shooting is that courts ordinarily analyze officer shootings under the Fourth
Amendment “excessive force” doctrine.398 Indeed, the Government argued
that the plaintiffs’ claims in Hernández were “cognizable only under the
Fourth Amendment and not under the Fifth Amendment.”399 Analyzing
extraterritorial claims under the Fourth Amendment presents difficulties
that do not arise under the Fifth Amendment. The first is that the Supreme
Court has clearly held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
extraterritorial searches and seizures of alien property, at least for purposes
of the exclusionary rule.400 The second is that the Fourth Amendment
speaks of the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects.”401 While the “right of the people” may or may not have
been historically understood to refer only to the rights of U.S. citizens or
nationals, the Fourth Amendment suggests that possibility in a way that the
Fifth Amendment does not. Still, courts considering whether to apply the
Fourth Amendment to cross-border shootings could distinguish VerdugoUrquidez on the facts: a cross-border shooting does not raise any of the
Hernández, the Court remanded with instructions to consider the Bivens question in light of its recent
opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 137 S. Ct. at 2006–07.
395
137 S. Ct. at 2007.
396
Id.
397
Id.
398
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989).
399
Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
400
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
401
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264–65 (distinguishing the Fourth
Amendment from the Fifth Amendment, in part on this ground).

444

112:377 (2017)

Due Process Abroad

practical difficulties raised when U.S. officers engage in an investigation
abroad.402 Justice Anthony Kennedy, in particular, has been drawn to a
functional approach to constitutional extraterritoriality.403
By contrast to the Fourth Amendment, analysis of cross-border
shootings under the Due Process Clause would be clear, without territorial
and citizenship exceptions. The text of the clause apparently extends to all
U.S. deprivations of rights regardless of place or person. Moreover, the
history presented above corroborates this reading.404
Even were a court to hold that the Due Process Clause applies to a
cross-border shooting, it might nevertheless conclude that special factors
about such a shooting “counsel hesitation” about allowing a cause of action
against the federal officer.405 In particular, a court could conclude that
permitting a damages suit for extraterritorial conduct could raise diplomatic
and foreign affairs issues best left to the political branches.406
The foregoing history does not support that conclusion. During the
early years of the Republic, Americans enforced constitutional rights with
common law suits against government agents.407 As this Article has shown,
citizens and aliens alike routinely sued federal officers and agents for
violating their rights on the high seas.408 Furthermore, there is strong
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See Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (“The Fourth Amendment question in this case, however, is
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See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
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Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 297 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds.,
2009). See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (articulating the hesitation doctrine).
406
Even if the Court holds that parties may sue an officer for a cross-border shooting, it will
probably hold that the defendant in Hernández is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that the
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment was not well established when the shooting
occurred. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
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action.”); Woolhandler, supra note 328, at 100.
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See supra Section V.C.
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historical support for the notion that Americans understood that due
process required courts to enforce constitutional and statutory limits on
governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property.409 At a minimum, the
early cases provide powerful evidence that the federal courts did not
categorically exclude a suit against a federal officer on the ground that it
arose from extraterritorial conduct against aliens.
b.   Officially sponsored extraterritorial kidnapping and detention
The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to officially sponsored
deprivations of liberty in the form of unlawful captures and detentions. The
historical evidence discussed in this article suggests that captures and
detentions attributable to a U.S. law enforcement officer acting under color
of law are subject to due process of law—that is, officers must act
according to authority conferred by law and suspects are entitled to the
Constitution’s separation of powers and procedural protections. The
location of the capture or detention and the political loyalty of the
defendant are immaterial.410 Yet the Supreme Court has held that a court is
not obligated to dismiss a prosecution on the ground that the defendant was
brought into the court’s jurisdiction unlawfully.411 U.S. courts thus apply
the principle of male captus, bene detentus, which ensures that a defendant
will not escape punishment because of an officer’s wrongdoing.412
Two questions about deprivations of physical liberty abroad remain.
First, what is the appropriate remedy for a violation? It need not be
dismissal of the case. In the early Republic, courts awarded damages
against officers who, by exceeding their authority, committed trespass on
the high seas. The legislature routinely indemnified officers who had been
found liable.413 The Court could simply revive this practice today, perhaps
under the Alien Tort Act. Thus courts would provide a remedy for
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See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section V.C.
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United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (unlawful rendition from Mexico);
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extraterritorial conduct that violated the Due Process Clause without
abandoning the principle of male captus, bene detentus.414
The second question has to do with the application of the Constitution
to the conduct of a foreign sovereign or private party. Should the
Constitution prohibit the government from relying on the conduct of
another party that, if performed by a U.S. agent, would violate the Due
Process Clause? For instance, suppose Iraqi police capture and torture a
suspect and then send him, along with evidence gathered as a result of the
torture, to the United States for prosecution.
The history explored above does not speak directly to this point, but it
does offer some hints. Americans did engage in joint law enforcement
activities with other sovereigns, notably working with Spain and Britain to
capture pirates in Cuba and Puerto Rico. While American officers did not
personally violate the suspect’s due process rights, they apparently had no
qualms with capturing suspects in Cuba and handing them over to Spanish
authorities for trial and punishment by courts-martial.415 This might suggest
that Americans hewed to a strict understanding of sovereign responsibility
or what, in the context of U.S. constitutional doctrine, would be known as
“state action.”416 U.S. law governed American officers but did not apply to
other nations. U.S. officers bore no legal responsibility for another
sovereign’s independent decisions. The evidence above does not resolve
whether this logic would have applied when the United States sought to
prosecute someone whose presence had been procured by an independent
sovereign (or private party) by means that would violate due process.
c.   Deprivation of immigration benefits
The principle of due process abroad applies as well to immigration
and other governmental entitlements. President Trump’s recent Executive
Orders instituting bans on travel to the United States by certain
nonimmigrants are to some extent in tension with this principle. The first
Order, for instance, purported to suspend the right of certain immigrants
(those with green cards) and nonimmigrants (those with temporary visas)
who had traveled abroad, or who wished to travel abroad, to reenter the
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See Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (“There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to
permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will.”).
415
See supra Section V.B.1.
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See generally Nathan S. Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and Town of
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United States.417 The restriction appeared to apply whether the alien was
abroad or within the United States when the President issued the Order.418
The Supreme Court has held that a “returning resident alien is entitled
as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges underlying any
attempt to exclude him.”419 The cases in which the Court has applied this
doctrine all arise from a permanent resident’s attempt to reenter the United
States after traveling abroad.420 While Congress has vast discretion to
determine the procedures to which immigrants are entitled,421 the Court has
made it clear that due process of law requires the government to comply
with those statutory procedures on a case-by-case basis.422 Furthermore, the
Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires some minimum
procedural protections, although it has not clarified what those protections
are.423 The underlying right is a statutory right of reentry. Therefore, it is
probably best understood as a form of “new property”424 subject to
deprivation according to the “procedural due process” test articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge.425 Under this test, courts weigh the claimant’s right—
in this case the right of reentry—against the government’s interest in
depriving the claimant of the right and the relative cost of procedures that
would afford a more accurate adjudication.426
The foregoing history provides very little evidence that is directly on
point. The founding generation did not consider statutory rights to be a
form of “property” that the legislature could not change for an entire class
without an adjudication.427 They did, however, understand that the
government could not deprive persons of rights abroad without due
process. Translating the due process regime of the Founding Era into our
417
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own, therefore, suggests that permanent residents would be entitled to some
minimum procedural protections before being deprived of the statutory
right to return to the United States. Understood this way, the history does
support the current doctrine, although because it requires a translation of
the historical understanding of property, it may go too far to conclude that
the government is required to provide a trial in federal court for each
permanent resident before it may deprive the resident of the right to return.
In such cases, Mathews may strike the right balance.428
d.   Criminal procedure
The principle that due process protects those abroad from unlawful
governmental deprivations likewise has implications for procedures in
criminal prosecutions in U.S. courts. Most obviously, it suggests that
criminal defendants are entitled to equal procedural safeguards regardless
of whether they are prosecuted for conduct abroad and regardless of their
nationality.
Difficulties can arise when the allegedly criminal conduct occurred
abroad. For instance, Michael Farbiarz has noted that although the
government has wide authority pursuant to treaties to discover evidence
abroad, some defendants may be unable to rely on a subpoena to obtain
evidence abroad.429 This gives the government an advantage in discovery
that it does not have in prosecutions that do not rely on extraterritorial
evidence. The government did not have this advantage in the first years of
the Republic. Originally, the government and defendant were equally
disadvantaged by a dearth of evidence and witnesses in cases arising on the
high seas or within foreign territory. Evidence and witnesses for the
government and defendant alike were ordinarily restricted to the ship,
cargo, papers, and crews involved in the capture. The U.S. Navy was not an
investigative outfit.
To solve the modern mismatch, Farbiarz proposes that courts issue a
Rule 17 order that prosecutors would be obligated to enforce. Rule 17
authorizes a court to issue a subpoena requiring a witness to appear and
testify, to produce evidence, or to attend a deposition.430 Under Farbiarz’s
proposal, a subpoena issued on behalf of a defendant requiring the
testimony or production of evidence of a witness outside the United States
428
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would obligate the prosecutor to work with treaty partners to procure that
testimony or evidence.431 Unfortunately, Farbiarz does not explain how the
court would ensure compliance with such a subpoena. At one point he
suggests that “dismissal of the case” might be an appropriate remedy for
failure to comply, at least in some cases,432 but later states that “as a
practical matter,” “the prosecutor would” “enforce” the court’s Rule 17
decision.433 Elsewhere he asserts that “structural concerns should have no
role to play in shaping such a due process doctrine.”434
Relying on a prosecutor to enforce due process does not comply with
the historical understanding of due process. Under that understanding,
courts ensured that government agents did not deprive persons of rights
except by law. If due process requires the government to provide a
defendant with equal opportunity to gather evidence abroad, allowing the
prosecutor to oversee that opportunity would not satisfy due process.
Farbiarz’s proposal would more closely approximate historical due process
if the court supervised and enforced the subpoena by threat of discipline
against the government officers who failed to comply, whether through
contempt, dismissal of the indictment, or some other form of discipline.
This would preserve the court’s structural role as the institution responsible
for safeguarding the defendant’s due process rights and incentivize the
prosecutor’s compliance.
4.   War
Many of the most contentious questions of constitutional
extraterritoriality arise from the nation’s prosecution of the “war on terror.”
This Article has focused on the early history of the nation’s nonwar law
enforcement abroad, but it does have some implications for an analysis of
due process during war. The evidence suggests that, outside of war, at least,
due process applied not only to those captured abroad and tried in the
United States but also to the conduct of U.S. officers abroad.435 This alters
the baseline question for the original understanding of due process during
war. Location alone cannot resolve the application of the Bill of Rights to
the exercise of war powers abroad.436
The Constitution itself provides for departures from ordinary due
process during war. The Suspension Clause and the Third Amendment
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condition such departures upon war and require that the departures be
according to law.437 Likewise, the Constitution gives Congress the authority
to provide for different procedures for the military justice system,438 and
Congress has done so from the beginning.439 These are entirely consistent
with the notion of due process of law this Article has assumed—Congress
may provide, by law, for departures from ordinary due process of law
because the Constitution, a higher law, says so.
The more interesting historical questions are whether, when, and how
a state of war entitled Congress to depart from ordinary due process of law
with respect to enemies at home and abroad. Likewise, could the President
do so, in the course of repelling an attack or during a state of war, without
congressional authority? These are issues I would like to explore more fully
in future scholarship that builds on this Article’s historical groundwork.
Outside of the context of a criminal investigation, prosecution, and
punishment, the foregoing historical evidence has little to say about the
proper application of due process to the government’s antiterrorism efforts.
CONCLUSION
The application of due process to the government’s conduct abroad is
of immediate and vital importance. Cases involving cross-border shootings,
the suspension of immigration benefits, and the investigative conduct of
U.S. officers abroad fill the headlines, and cases raising similar issues will
likely continue to proliferate. Unfortunately, the doctrine regarding the
extraterritoriality of the Due Process Clause remains woefully
underdeveloped, vague, and inconsistent. The Supreme Court seems intent
on extending constitutional rights abroad on an ad hoc, functional basis that
exacerbates uncertainty and maximizes judicial discretion. Scholars have
justified this approach, at least with respect to the Due Process Clause, on
the basis of original history. This Article upends that historical account.
Based on the English background, the Constitution’s text and structure, and
early federal practice, this Article argues that at its Founding, the federal
government could not exercise its powers of law enforcement to deprive a
437
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person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The location
of the illegal conduct, the location of the capture, and the nationality of the
defendant were immaterial. A corollary of this principle was that everyone
could sue a U.S. officer in federal court for an unauthorized deprivation of
rights abroad. This history has important implications for contemporary
U.S. law enforcement abroad, the suspension of immigration benefits, and
suits against U.S. officers. It also resets the baseline assumptions for
considering the historical relationship between the separation of powers
and individual rights during war. The question going forward is to what
extent the war powers authorize the government to depart from the ordinary
requirements of due process of law before depriving enemies, neutrals, and
even citizens of life, liberty, or property.
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